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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Ada County. 
The Honorable Samuel A. Hoagland, District Judge, presiding. 
Richard Alan Eppink, residing at Boise, Idaho; Jason D. Williamson, residing at New York, 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
There is no question that Idaho's public defense system is constitutionally inadequate. Six 
years ago, an independent report requested by Governor Otter's Criminal Justice Commission 
found just that. R., p. 7, para. 1. Last year, Governor Otter declared publicly that Idaho's "current 
method of providing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass constitutional 
muster." R., p. 7, para. 2. The district court in this case itself observed that ·'[w]ithout a doubt ... 
there are serious problems with public defense in Idaho that need to be addressed." R., p. 492. 
Who bears responsibility to fix this broken system? The district court held that the Governor has 
"direct supervisory authority over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally 
sound public defense system," and that Idaho's statewide Public Defense Commission ("PDC") 
is "specifically saddled with the responsibility of creating rules" to improve public defense in 
Idaho. R., p. 485. 
Yet, even with additional authority recently granted by statute, Defendants ("State") have 
failed to implement actual change on the ground-in courtrooms across the state-where the 
liberty of individual Idahoans hangs in the balance. Indeed, the PDC has failed to meet every one 
of its clear, mandatory statutory deadlines. R., p. 24-25, para. 48-49; p. 497. 
Due to these systemic statewide deficiencies, Plaintiffs and the proposed class they 
represent have suffered the consequences of actual denial of counsel at critical stages of their 
criminal proceedings, as well as constructive denial of counsel under circumstances long 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court as ··so likely to prejudice the accused that the 
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cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 
648, 658 (1984). As a result Plaintiffs have been locked up, forced to spend months in jail with 
little or no access to an attorney, denied access to meaningful-if any-investigation into their 
cases, delayed justice, and, in the case of the lead plaintiff: compelled to plead guilty in the face 
of dwindling prospects for any adequate defense. R., p. 8-12, 27-33 para. 4-7, 63-84. 
The structure of Idaho's public defense system itself results in ongoing pre-trial and 
collateral harms to al I indigent defendants in Idaho, including actual denial of counsel during 
initial court appearances and other critical stage proceedings, public defenders overloaded by 
crushing caseloads, lack of meaningful access to appointed counsel, inadequate availability of 
defense investigators and experts, inadequate training of public defenders, and control by county 
commissioners untrained in the law and unequipped to supervise criminal law practice. R., p. 14-
17 para.12-20, p. 25-26 para. 53-59, p. 32 para. 101, p. 38-52 para. 103-53. 
Plaintiffs allege that these problems are the result of state-level, systemic, and structural 
deficiencies-not that they are sporadic problems present only in some instances. R., p. 38 para. 
102. Through this appeal, Plaintiffs merely seek the opportunity to pursue discovery and present 
substantive evidence to the trial court in support of their allegations. 
Although the named plaintiffs' individual criminal cases illustrate many of the problems 
faced by indigent defendants across the State, at the crux of Plaintiffs' Complaint are the larger, 
structural deficiencies that plague Idaho's indigent defense system as a whole. The lower court's 
analysis hinged, mistakenly, on the Supreme Court's analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims in individual cases, as articulated in Strickland,~ Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), rather 
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than on the Court's Cronic framework for analyzing structural denials of counsel. See R., p. 491-
92. The district court held that the case was therefore not justiciable, because Plaintiffs had not 
yet been convicted or pursued appellate or post-conviction remedies. See R., p. 494. 
Plaintiffs, however, pleaded in detail the pre-trial and collateral harm that Idaho's 
deficient statewide system had already caused them. R., p. 52-54. They alleged with particularity 
that those harms were a result of state-level, not county-level, failings, R., p. 55, and that the 
deficiencies were not limited to the counties in which the named plaintiffs were prosecuted or to 
those plaintiffs' specific cases. R., p. 12-17 para. 8-21, p. 25-26 para. 52-59, p. 37-52, para. 
101-154. Further, Plaintiffs never alleged Strickland violations with regard to their individual 
criminal cases; they specifically alleged systemic and constructive denial of counsel under 
Cronic. R., p. 26 para. 59. Under Cronic, Plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims, all of 
which are ripe and appropriate for judicial review under the separation of powers doctrine. 
The remedies Plaintiffs seek are fully within Defendants' power to provide. The district 
court agreed that both the Governor and the PDC had "a more than sufficiently close connection 
or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485. The recent passage of House 
Bill 504 by the Idaho Legislature makes that connection and enforcement power even clearer. 
The district court's decision granting the State's Motion to Dismiss should be reversed. 
B. Procedural History 
Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief on June 
17, 2015. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. The district court heard oral argument on the 
Motion to Dismiss on December 16, 2015, and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
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Granting the Motion to Dismiss on January 20, 2016. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal the 
next business day after they received a copy of the district court's decision. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Where Plaintiffs expressly plead pre-trial, post-conviction, and ongoing harm due to 
systemic statewide constitutional violations, caused by the Defendants' failure to act or 
fulfill specific duties and powers and which they have the present authority to remedy, 
have Plaintiffs adequately pleaded standing to sue? 
B. Where harm from those systemic, statewide constitutional violations has already occurred 
and remains ongoing, is the case ripe for adjudication? 
C. Does the separation of powers doctrine prevent Idaho courts from protecting fundamental 
individual constitutional rights, over which the executive and legislative branches have 
no discretion? 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek attorney's fees from Defendants. S'ee I.R.C.P. 54(e); Idaho App. R. 41. 
Idaho's private attorney general doctrine provides for recovery of attorney's fees in actions of 
widespread importance to Idahoans. See Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682 P.2d 524, 
531 ( 1984); see also I.C. § 12-121. In determining whether to award attorney's fees under the 
doctrine, courts consider: (I) the strength or societal importance of the public policy indicated by 
the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden 
on the plaintiff, and (3) the number of people standing to benefit. Hellar, 160 Idaho at 578, 682 
P.2d at 531 (awarding attorney's fees under the private attorney general doctrine in a case 
brought to ensure that Idahoans were constitutionally represented in the state legislature). 
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This case is an archetype in all three categories. First, this case raises issues of such great 
societal importance that they have drawn attention from all three branches of government and 
major media outlets both within and outside of Idaho, for over five years. Second, private 
enforcement became necessary because Idaho officials failed for years to ensure the fulfillment 
of the fundamental and essential rights at stake in this case: the Governor's Commission created 
a committee, which recommended creating another committee, which recommended creating a 
statewide commission, which has failed--even after a statutory mandate-to promulgate rules or 
even make further recommendations. Only after Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit did Idaho see any 
meaningful discussion of systemic refonn. The resultant burden on Plaintiffs is enormous. 
Plaintiffs' counsel have spent over five years investigating the scope of the statewide crisis and 
urging systemic reform without the need for litigation. The case calls for putative class counsel 
to invest considerable time and resources into ensuring these fundamental rights are vindicated 
as soon as possible. The number of people standing to benefit in this case includes every criminal 
and juvenile defendant with pending charges throughout the state, plus all future criminal and 
juvenile defendants in Idaho. Considering the gravity of the human and constitutional rights at 
stake, the fact that all Idaho courts are inextricably tied to the day-to-day protection of those 
rights in all of Idaho's courtrooms, and the number of Idahoans impacted, this case is among the 
most historic this Court has ever decided. Plaintiffs are entitled to fees under the private attorney 
general doctrine if they prevail on appeal. 
In addition, the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, exists to 
·'ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances." Hensley 
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v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). This provision was 
specifically intended "to authorize fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued 
in their official capacities." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-694 ( 1978). Under § 1988, 
plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee" when they prevail on a 42 U .S.C. § 1983 
claim. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 (internal quotation marks omitted). To be a "prevailing party" 
under this statute, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain relief on the merits of the claim. Farner v. 
Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 337, 342, 17 P.3d 281, 286 (2000) (citing Farrar v. 
Hobby, 506 U.S. I 03, 111 (1992)). Plaintiffs will be prevailing parties if the actual relief ordered 
by the Court materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the State's 
behavior in a way that would directly benefit the Plaintiffs. See Cunningham v. Wa(ford, 131 
Idaho 841,843,965 P.2d 201,203 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-112). ff 
Plaintiffs prevail in this case, they are entitled to recover full attorney's fees under § 1988 
because their federal and state law claims are based on the same facts. See Farner, 135 Idaho 
337, 342, 17 P.3d 281, 286 (2000) (reasoning that because a class of teachers' "federal claims 
relied upon the same facts as their state law claims, the Teachers are entitled to recover their 
attorney fees under § 1988"); Lowder v. Minidoka Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 
840-41, 979 P.2d 1192, 1198-99 (1999) (awarding attorney's fees under § 1988 for a successful 
appeal of mixed state and federal claims); Lubcke v. Boise City/ Ada Cty. Haus. Auth., 124 [daho 
450, 454-55, 468, 860 P.2d 653, 657-58, 671 (1993) (same). 
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Plaintiffs' claims aim to enforce fundamental constitutional rights being denied to 
Idahoans to this day because of the State's prior insufficient efforts to address public defense in 
Idaho. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees if they prevail in this appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court ·'makes every reasonable intendment in order to sustain a complaint against a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 
398, 403 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The issue at the motion to dismiss stage .. is 
not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer 
evidence to support the claims." Fuchs v. State, Dept. of Idaho State Police, Bureau of Alcohol 
Beverage Control, 152 Idaho 626, 629, 272 P.3d 1257, 1260 (2012) (citation omitted). A 
dismissal must be reversed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 
400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 785 (1960). 
The Court must liberally construe Plaintiffs' complaint and presume that all facts alleged 
therein are true. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. White, 86 Idaho 374, 376, 386 P.2d 964, 964 ( 1963). The 
Court must also draw all inferences from the record in the plaintiffs' favor. ISEEO v. Evans, 123 
Idaho 573, 578, 850 P.2d 724, 729 ( 1993) [hereinafter ISEEO I]. Only after the Court has drawn 
all inferences in the plaintiffs' favor may it consider whether the complaint states a claim. Id. 
And even then, this Court views dismissals under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) with disfavor, ''because the 
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primary objective of the law is to obtain a determination of the merits of the claim.'' FVackerli, 82 
Idaho at 404, 353 P.2d at 784. 
Justiciability issues, including standing, ripeness, and separation of powers, present 
questions of iaw over which this Court exercises free review. In re Jerome Cty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 
153 Idaho 298, 308, 281 P.3d 1076, I 086 (2012); see Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 
639, 778 P.2d 757, 761 (1989). This Court also exercises free review over the constitutional 
issues raised by this appeal. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,561, 149 P.3d 833,836 (2006). 
B. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Justiciable 
The district court's dismissal of the Complaint rested on three distinct justiciability 
doctrines: standing, ripeness, and separation of powers. Two of those grounds, standing and 
ripeness, were never raised, briefed, or argued by either side. Below, Plaintiffs explain the harm 
and urgency that plainly establish their standing and why the constitutionality of Idaho's public 
defense system is fully ripe for decision, all of which were evident from the Complaint. Further, 
Plaintiffs maintain that the lower court's separation of powers rationale is a jarring departure 
from this Court's precedents, and it is erroneous because this case is about fundamental 
individual rights, not the exclusive discretionary functions of other branches of government. 
1. Plaintiffs Have Standing. 
Unlike the federal courts, Idaho state courts are not constrained by any constitutional 
·'case or controversy" limit on jurisdiction. Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Lawrence Denney, No. 43169, 
2015 WL 7421342, at *3 (Idaho Nov. 20, 2015); see also Michael S. Gilmore, Standing Law in 
Idaho: A Constitutional Wrong Turn, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 509, 511 (1995) ("Idaho appellate courts' 
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adoption of federal standing principles ... is inconsistent with the common law, is not required 
by the Idaho Constitution or by Idaho statute, is poor policy, and therefore should be 
abandoned."). This Court, nevertheless, has looked to federal justiciability doctrine for guidance 
in some cases. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7 421342 at *3. 
Because the Idaho Constitution lacks any "case or controversy" limitation, this Court 
relaxes the standing requirements in cases raising significant constitutional questions. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at *3, *4. Thus, even a plaintiff who does not demonstrate 
standing will be allowed to proceed where otherwise there may be no one else ready and willing 
to enforce fundamental constitutional guarantees. Id. at *5. When analyzing standing at the 
pleading stage, "[g]eneral factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct 
may suffice," and the court will "presum[ e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts 
that are necessary to support the claim." Jewel v. Nat 'l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,889); see also Fort Hall Landowners 
All., Inc. v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D. Idaho 2006) ("[T]he injury 
itself need be nothing more than a trifle.") (quoting Nat 'l Wildl(fe Fed'n v. Burford, 871 F.2d 849, 
854 (9th Cir. 1989)); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 ( 1973) ("[A]n identifiable 
trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle."). 
Under the federal formulation, this Court has held that a petitioner must show "a distinct 
palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the 
challenged conduct." Coal.for Agric. s Future v. Canyon Cty., No. 42756, 2016 WL 1133369, at 
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*3 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016) ( citation omitted). Plaintiffs, who have been locked up and denied 
counsel both constructively and actually, satisfy these requirements. 
a. Injury-in-Fact 
The district court's analysis of the injury-in-fact prong of the standing inquiry in this case 
was rooted in a fundamentally flawed assumption: that a criminal defendant suffers harm as a 
result of inadequate legal representation only after he or she has been convicted and sentenced. 
The court wrote that because none of the Plaintiffs had yet been convicted or sentenced, ·'the 
Court fail[ed] to see how the Plaintiffs have suffered an injury at the time the Complaint was 
filed in this matter." R., p. 488-489. 
This was error. First of all, the lower court was wrong as a factual matter. Before the 
lower court's decision, lead plaintiff Tracy Tucker had been convicted and sentenced. Indeed, 
Tucker expressly alleged in the Complaint that he had already pleaded guilty to a felony, after 
spending three months in pre-trial detention without being able to communicate effectively or 
consistently with his attorney and with no prospect of meaningful investigation into his case. R., 
p. 8, 52, para. 4, 156. Months before the district court's January 2016 decision, formal judgment 
was entered against Tucker and he was sentenced to a suspended prison term of two years fixed, 
plus two additional years indeterminate. See State v. Tucker, Bonner County case no. CR-2015-
1172 (Aug. 3, 2015). Hence, even under the court's own erroneous standing analysis, the lead 
plaintiff cleared the injury-in-fact bar. Cf !SEEO I, 123 Idaho at 578, 850 P.2d at 729 (holding 
that in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts must draw all inferences 
from both the pleadings in the plaintiffs' favor). 
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Second, the Complaint expressly alleges actual denial of counsel at constitutionally 
significant, ··critical" stages of the named Plaintiffs' criminal proceedings. R., p. 38-40, 52, 54, 
para. I 03-114, 156, 157, 159. Actual denial of counsel at a critical stage causes such clear, 
constitutional harm that a defendant need not show any prejudice to establish reversible error. 
United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004). Actual denial of counsel also 
results in the loss of pre-trial liberty interests. Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 223 
(N.Y. 2010). In the Hurrell-Harring case out of New York, as in Idaho, criminal defendants were 
not being represented at arraignment, when bail was first set-a .. critical stage" of the criminal 
proceeding. Id. Actual denial of counsel at those critical stages has "most serious consequences, 
both direct and collateral, including the loss of employment and housing, and inability to support 
and care for particularly needy dependents." Id Idaho defendants, like those in New York, have 
not only constitutional rights to counsel at critical stages, including initial appearance, but 
express statutory rights as well. I.C. § I9-852(l)(a), (2)(a) ("An indigent person ... is entitled .. 
. [t]o be counseled and defended at all stages of the matter beginning with the earliest time when 
a person providing his own counsel would be entitled to be represented by an attorney .... "). 
Actual denial of counsel at critical stages is a sufficient injury-in-fact. 
Third, Plaintiffs expressly pleaded constructive denial of counsel in the Complaint. See 
R., p. 26 para. 59. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that structural deficiencies in Idaho's indigent 
defense system have created a situation in which it is functionally impossible for any public 
defender, no matter how well-intentioned, to provide constitutionally adequate representation. 
Such claims are not analyzed under the individualized ineffective assistance of counsel 
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framework articulated in Strickland v. Washington. Rather, where structural deficiencies are 
alleged, it is unnecessary to evaluate the outcome of any individual indigent defendant's case to 
determine whether the Sixth Amendment has been compromised. Instead, as the Supreme Court 
announced in Cronic, decided on the same day as Strickland, prejudice is presumed where the 
system itself is constitutionally deficient: 
There are, however, circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that 
the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. . . . 
Circumstances of that magnitude may be present on some occasions when 
although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that 
any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so 
small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual 
conduct of the trial. 
466 U.S. at 658-660; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (acknowledging that there are 
instances in which prejudice is "so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the 
cost."). As Plaintiffs pleaded in the Complaint, Idaho's indigent defense system is emblematic of 
the kind of circumstances described in Cronic. See, e.g., R., p. 25-27, para. 51-60. 
Both federal and state courts that have considered constructive denial of counsel claims 
under similar circumstances have recognized the inevitable and irreparable injury suffered by 
indigent defendants as a result of systemic deficiencies in indigent defense delivery systems, 
irrespective of the ultimate outcome of the individual cases at issue. See Wilbur v. City of Mount 
Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1131 (W.D. Wash. 2013); Lucky v. Harris, 860 F.2d IO 12, IO 17 
(11th Cir. 1988); Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 222; Duncan v. Michigan, 774 N. W.2d 89 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009), ajJ'd on other grounds, 780 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 2010); Phillips v. State of 
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California, No. l 5CECG02201, slip op. at 4-5 (Cal. Superior Ct. April 13, 2016) (appended as 
an Exhibit to this brief). 
In Wilbur, the court specifically rejected the notion that the only relevant inquiry was 
whether the plaintiffs achieved a favorable outcome in their individual underlying criminal cases: 
The Court does not dispute the fact that many, if not the vast majority, of the 
plaintiff class obtained a reasonable resolution of the charges against them. The 
problem is not the ultimate disposition: if plaintiffs were alleging that counsel 
had affirmatively erred and obtained a deleterious result, the Sixth Amendment 
challenge would have been brought under Strickland v. Washingon, rather than 
Gideon v. Wainwright. 
989 F.Supp.2d at 1127 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). The court emphasized 
that its decision was based on a "system [that] is broken to such an extent that confidential 
attorney/client communications are rare, the individual defendant is not represented in any 
meaningful way, and actual innocence could conceivably go unnoticed and unchampioned." Id. 
Hence, the court determined that the plaintiffs had "easily met" their burden of demonstrating 
"irreparable injury and the inadequacy of available legal remedies," as required when seeking 
injunctive relief. Id. at 1133. The court went on to explicitly explain the irreparable harm that a 
deficient system causes to a criminal defendant, long before conviction or sentencing, noting that 
·'the lack of an actual representational relationship and/or adversarial testing injures both the 
indigent defendant and the criminal justice system as a whole." Id. 
New York's highest court reached the same conclusion, recognizing that '·the absence of 
representation at critical stages is capable of causing grave and irreparable injury to persons who 
will not be convicted. Gideon's guarantee to the assistance of counsel does not turn upon a 
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defendant's guilt or innocence, and neither can the availability of a remedy for its denial." 
Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227. The court held that under the Sixth Amendment, '·the period 
between arraignment and trial when a case must be factually developed and researched, decisions 
respecting grand jury testimony made, plea negotiations conducted, and pretrial motions filed" 
also constitutes a critical stage during which criminal defendants will suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of counsel. Id. at 224 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985)). 
Most recently, in Phillips, a California court rejected the State's argument that the 
plaintiffs were required to satisfy the Strickland test in order to demonstrate the systemic failure 
to provide counsel to indigent defendants. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not seeking to 
challenge individual convictions, but rather a range of broader deficiencies that harm indigent 
defendants in Fresno County, including excessive caseloads, lack of conflict-free representation, 
inadequate opportunity for consultation, inadequate factual investigation, and lack of meaningful 
adversarial testing. Phillips, slip op. at 5-6 (appended as an Exhibit to this brief). As such, the 
court found that "plaintiffs need not plead and prove the elements of ineffective assistance as to 
specific individuals in order to state a cause of action." Id. at 6. 
Social science research corroborates the case law. Specifically, empirical research has 
concluded that pre-trial detention has a tremendous impact on the outcome of a case, thereby 
causing great hann to criminal defendants. For instance, a study released by the Arnold 
Foundation in 2013 measured the impact of pre-trial detention on the case outcomes for over 
153,000 defendants booked into a Kentucky jail over a one-year period. Most significantly, the 
study found that pre-trial detention resulted in dramatically worse outcomes, including the fact 
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that those "defendants who [ were] detained for the entire pretrial period were 5.41 times more 
likely to be sentenced to jail and 3.76 times more likely to be sentenced to prison'' as those who 
were released at some point before trial or case disposition. 1 More generally, "[d]efendants who 
are detained for the entire pretriai period receive ionger jail and prison sentences. Id. Hence, 
pre-trial detention has a negative effect on the defendant's prospects, particularly as compared to 
defendants who have spent less time in jail pre-trial. Plaintiffs expressly allege in the Complaint 
that they have spent unnecessary time in pre-trial detention due to systemic deficiencies with 
Idaho's public defense system. See R., p. 41-42, para. 115-118, p. 53-54, para. 156-159. 
In concluding that pre-conviction harm is not real harm, the district court ignored the 
significant and palpable injuries that Plaintiffs, and putative class members, suffer as a result of a 
system infected with structural deficiencies. As Plaintiffs allege in the Complaint, the attorneys 
charged with representing indigent defendants in Idaho face overwhelming caseloads, as well as 
a lack of sufficient time, resources, training, and supervision. R., p. 42-47, para. 119-134. These 
system-wide deficiencies hinder all attorneys who provide public defense services from 
effectively representing their clients at critical stages of their cases. The systemic problems have 
led to inability to communicate with their clients effectively and on a consistent basis, if at all; to 
properly investigate their clients' cases, if at all; or to secure expert analysis and testimony that 
could be essential to their clients' cases. See R. p., 37-52, para. 101-154. As a result of these 
1Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Ph.D., Marie VanNostrand, Ph.D., Alexander Holsinger, Ph.D., 
Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Investigating the Impact of Pretrial Detention on Sentencing 
Outcomes 4 (November 2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/LJ AF_ Report_ state-sentencing_ FN L. pdf. 
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deficiencies, Plaintiffs were deprived of effective bail advocacy at initial appearance, leading to 
unnecessary time spent in pre-trial detention, the inability to participate meaningfully in their 
own defense, and the loss of key witnesses and evidence, among other irreversible harm. 
Moreover, the inability of Idaho public defenders to adequately develop cases not only 
leads to increased pressure to plead guilty, even where the defendant is innocent or has other 
compelling defenses, but also necessarily diminishes defense attorneys' ability to negotiate 
favorable plea agreements. See, e.g., ·wilbur, 989 F. Supp.2d at 1127. In Maine v. Moulton, the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that "to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to 
trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself." 474 U.S. at 170. The 
critical importance of pre-trial advocacy is why the right to counsel '·attaches at earlier, 'critical' 
stages in the criminal justice process 'where the results might well settle the accused's fate and 
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.'" Id. (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs allege in the 
Complaint, expressly and in detail, severe systemic deficiencies during these critical, pre-trial 
stages.SeeR.,p.13-14,para 11-14,p.38--42,para.103-118,p.46--47,para.131-134. 
Plaintiffs' allegations demonstrate harm in three ways: ( 1) pleading guilty due to 
inadequate representation, resulting in conviction; (2) actual denial of counsel at critical stages; 
and (3) constructive denial of counsel throughout their cases due to additional systemic 
deficiencies with Idaho's statewide indigent defense system. These allegations far exceed the 
injury-in-fact threshold. Compare the circumstances in Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term 
Limits, where voters challenged a law requiring that the Idaho Secretary of State publish 
information about candidates' adherence to term limits pledges. 135 Idaho 121, 123, 15 P.3d 
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1129, 113 I (2000). The petitioners there alleged that the publication requirement "greatly 
diminish[ed] the likelihood the candidate of their choice will prevail in the election.'' Id at 125, 
15 P.3d at 1133. That allegation, together with the claim that the law violated the petitioners' 
right to vote, was deemed sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. Id. Here, Plaintiffs plead far more, 
and thus adequately plead standing. 
b. Causal Connection 
The district court concluded that it is the State, not the counties, that "is ultimately 
responsible for ensuring constitutionally-sound public defense" and that "the Governor and the 
PDC members have a more than sufficiently close connection or nexus to the enforcement of 
public defense in Idaho." R., p. 472,485 (emphasis added). But in a bizarre twist, the lower court 
nevertheless concluded that "[t]he connection of the claimed injury"-violation of the Plaintiffs' 
right to counsel-"to the Governor and the PDC [is] too remote to be fairly traceable." R., p. 
490. To conclude that state officials have a sufficiently direct connection to Idaho's 
unconstitutional system to be proper defendants, yet that Plaintiffs' injuries are not fairly 
traceable to those officials' conduct in maintaining that system, is inherently contradictory. 
Whether there is a sufficient connection for state officials to be proper defendants and whether 
there is a sufficient causal connection to establish standing are "closely related-indeed 
overlapping-inquir[ies]"; demonstrating one connection will, for the same reasons, demonstrate 
the other. Culinary Workers Union, Local 226v. Del Papa, 200 F.3d 614,619 (9th Cir. 1999). 
Furthermore, in conducting standing analysis, the defendants' conduct need not be a 
"proximate" or "but for" cause of the alleged harms. Canyon Cty. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 
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F.3d 969, 974 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008); Johnson v. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1983). Standing 
exists even when the defendant indirectly harms the plaintiff. VVarth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 
(1975); see also Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, I 070 (9th Cir. 2011) (''A causal chain 
does not fail simply because it has several ·links."'). Indeed, the causal chain between the 
governor of California and litigation delays in Los Angeles County, which the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged seemed "tenuous," was sufficient to establish standing. Los Angeles Cty. Bar 
Ass 'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 70 I (9th Cir. 1992). Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a 
group of five Washington, D.C.-area law students had established standing to sue the federal 
government based on the causal chain between harm to the students' "use and enjoyment of 
natural resources in the Washington area'' and an increase in federal rates for rail freight (because 
the rate increase might have led to increased use of non-recyclable commodities, which in turn 
might have resulted in greater depletion of natural resources). SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686. 
Here, in comparison, the links are both plausible and direct: the Governor "has direct 
supervisory authority over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally sound 
public defense system" and the PDC is "specifically saddled with the responsibility of creating 
rules" to regulate and improve public defense delivery throughout the state. R., p. 485. To the 
extent there was any serious question regarding this issue, the Governor and Legislature's recent 
enactment of House Bill 504 puts it to rest: effective July 1, 2016, the PDC, under LC. § 19-850, 
is mandated to promulgate standards for public defense statewide and empowered to enforce 
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them in each county.2 Moreover, under LC. § 19-862A, the PDC may grant additional funds to 
individual counties and/or directly take over public defense in a particular noncompliant county, 
intercepting county revenue if necessary. 
In addition, in faiiing to recognize Plaintiffs' allegations of systemic deficiencies in 
Idaho's public defense system, the court mistakenly suggests that the individual counties (along 
with the Legislature) are "the principle bodies with the power to affect the policy (political) and 
systemic changes Plaintiffs seek." R., p. 490. Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege 
longstanding, statewide deficiencies in the Idaho system, which result in actual and constructive 
denial of counsel across the state. R., p. 7-8, para 1-2, p. 13-17, para. 8-21, p. 20-22, para. 34-
37, p. 25-26, para. 52-59, p. 37-52, para. 98-154. Absent from the court's reasoning is any 
explanation of how individual counties (through their county commissioners) would have the 
authority or practical ability to remedy these statewide deficiencies. That omission is 
unsurprising, because the counties cannot provide a statewide remedy. Only state officials with a 
sufficient connection to indigent defense delivery across the state-namely the PDC and the 
Governor as its supervisor-are capable of providing such a remedy. 
c. Redressability 
Like its treatment of the injury-in-fact inquiry, the court's redressability analysis is based 
on a false premise. Rather than recognizing Plaintiffs' constructive denial of counsel theory of 
the case and properly analyzing the case under Gideon and Cronic, the court viewed Plaintiffs' 
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claims through the inapposite prism of Strickland. Contrary to the court's assertion, Plaintiffs are 
not '·seek[ing] relief in their individual cases as well as in all other indigent criminal cases in 
Idaho." R., p. 490. That request is nowhere to be found in Plaintiffs' prayer for relief. Plaintiffs 
do not seek a case-by-case review of all criminal matters currently pending across the state. 
Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the statewide indigent defense delivery system in Idaho is in such a 
state of disrepair that "the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide 
effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into 
the actual conduct of the trial." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659---660; see also Phillips, p. 4 (allowing suit 
to go forward upon finding that plaintiffs-indigent criminal defendants seeking prospective 
relief from systematic deprivations of the right to counsel-were not, in doing so, challenging 
individual convictions.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a judgment from the Court declaring the 
statewide system unconstitutional, and requiring the State to actually implement effective refonn. 
Given that the Plaintiffs allege statewide, systemic deficiencies in Idaho's indigent 
defense system (which must be taken as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss), and 
the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of constructive denial of counsel under Cronic, the task 
before the Court is to detennine whether the injuries suffered as a result of those systemic 
deficiencies are redressable. They are. 
As the district court itself pointed out, under the law in effect at the time Plaintiffs filed 
suit, the PDC was "saddled with the responsibility of creating rules regarding training and 
education of defense attorneys and making recommendations to the legislature for improving 
public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485. Moreover, under the amendments to Idaho's public defense 
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statutes that will take effect on July 1, 2016, the PDC will now have authority to enforce 
performance standards, LC. § 19-850( 1 )( a)(vi), (vii), provide counties with supplemental 
resources for the delivery of indigent defense services, LC. § 19-862A, and take responsibility 
itseif for ensuring that the statutory standards are met, LC. § l 9-862A( 11 ). Standards like those, 
if actually implemented and enforced, could directly remedy many of the deficiencies identified 
by Plaintiffs in their Complaint. 
The Governor, too, has the power to redress the alleged injuries, both by issuing 
executive orders that can impact indigent defense and by exercising his "direct supervisory 
authority over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally sound public defense 
system." R., p. 485. The Governor has broad executive order authority that enables him to 
influence statewide policies and procedures, including those relating to public defense. He has 
recently used that authority to task an executive branch commission, the Idaho Juvenile Justice 
Commission, with "ensur[ing] compliance" by local jurisdictions with the federal Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Act, including authorizing the commission to take "remedial actions for 
violations." Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-11 (Oct. 1, 2015).3 Earlier this year, he empowered an 
executive branch council to play an "expanded role" beyond its statutory authority and tasked it 
with the duty of "[a]lign[ing] policy and funding systems." Idaho Exec. Order No. 2016-01 (Jan. 
28, 2016). 4 The Governor has already created, by executive order, a state Criminal Justice 
Commission (CJC) to identify challenges facing Idaho's criminal justice system and recommend 
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solutions. Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-10 (Sep. 23, 2015).5 If other bodies and procedures are 
failing to bring Idaho's indigent defense system up to constitutional muster, the Governor can 
expand the CJC's role to include enforcement powers, as he has with the Idaho Juvenile Justice 
Commission. See Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-l l. The Governor, on his own, can and has taken 
concrete steps to ensure that local and state government is complying with Idaho's federal and 
constitutional responsibilities. 
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that even under strict federal standing 
requirements, it is enough that the "practical consequence" of a court decision "would amount to 
a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redressed 
the injury suffered." Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002). In Evans, a court order for a new 
report from the Secretary of Commerce that the President or Congress would likely abide by was 
sufficient to establish standing. Id. at 463-464. Likewise, in Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass 'n v. Eu, 
the Ninth Circuit held that it was enough to show standing where the requested declaration 
would likely prompt the California legislature to act, even though its members were not parties to 
the case. 979 F.2d at 701. This Court, too, assumes that once it "fulfill[s] its constitutional duty to 
interpret the constitution the other branches of government also will carry out their defined 
constitutional duties in good faith and in a completely responsible manner." JSEEO I, 123 Idaho 
at 583, 850 P.2d at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs' injuries are directly redressable by both the Governor and the PDC. To the 
extent the Idaho Legislature ( or this Comt in its administrative and rulemaking functions) could 
5 Available at ============~=~=~~~=~~~~~= 
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provide further relief, a declaratory judgment will ensure that it is sufficiently likely that any 
other needed actions will be taken. 
d. Relaxed Standing Analysis Alternative 
Because Plaintiffs have raised significant constitutional issues, this Court need not 
conduct the full, federally based standing analysis detailed above. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 
7421342 at *4-*5; see also ISEEO v. Idaho State Ed. of Educ., 128 Idaho 276,284, 912 P.2d 
644, 652 (1996) (recognizing "public interest exception" to justiciability doctrines). Despite 
constitutional duties explicated by over fifty years of Supreme Court precedent since Gideon, the 
State has yet to implement reform, even after the Governor stated unequivocally that Idaho's 
public defense system is unconstitutional. Although the PDC has now been given greater 
authority with the passage of 2016 House Bill 504, it still has not even complied with its 
mandatory statutory requirements-enacted over two years ago-requiring it to promulgate rules 
and issue recommendations. J.C.§ 19-850(l)(a), (b) (2014). The PDC has, in fact, already twice 
failed to meet its explicit statutory deadlines. See l.C. § 19-850(l)(b) (2014). 
The constitutional right to counsel at issue in this case could not be more fundamental. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "essential" to fair 
trial, and that ·'if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be done." 
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (internal quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiffs cannot 
bring this lawsuit, there will be no one to enforce this essential right against continued inaction 
and delay by the PDC and other government officials. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 
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7421342 at *5. The circumstances presented in the Complaint in this case easily satisfy this 
Court's public interest justiciability standards. 
2. Plaintiffs' Claims Are Ripe for Review. 
Under Idaho law, a case is ripe if ''(l) litJ presents definite and concrete issues; (2) a real 
and substantial controversy exists (as opposed to hypothetical facts); and (3) there is a present 
need for adjudication." State v. Manley, 142 Idaho 338, 342, 127 P.3d 954, 958 (2005) (citing 
Noh v. Cenarrusa, 13 7 Idaho 798, 80 I, 53 P.3d 121 7, 1220 (2002) ). Ripeness analysis, in other 
words, "asks whether there is any need for court action at the present time." ABC Agra, LLC v. 
Critical Access Grp., Inc., 156 Idaho 781, 783, 331 P.3d 523, 525 (2014) (internal citation 
omitted). Where a future lawsuit would present no new facts or legal issues and it is clear that the 
issue will be before the court either now or in the future, "a declaration now of the various rights 
of the paities will certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future." Atiles, 
116 Idaho at 643, 778 P.2d at 765. 
"[W]here the facts of the case presently call for court action, this Court has held that an 
actual controversy exists." ABC Agra, 156 Idaho at 784, 331 P.3d at 526. In Boundary 
Backpackers v. Boundary County, for example, a challenge to a county ordinance that required 
state and federal agencies to comply with the county's land use plan was ripe despite county 
board members' testimony that they did not intend to enforce the ordinance. 128 Idaho 371, 376, 
913 P.2d 1141, 1146. This Court has also held that claims may be ripe for adjudication even 
where there is no immediately apparent damage. See, e.g., Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 
394 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a contractual dispute was ripe for adjudication, 
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even though the dispute prevented one of the parties from selling his property interest under the 
contract, because there was "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 
interests, of sufficient immediacy and rarity to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.") 
Id. at 671. This Court held that a challenge to Idaho's Term Limits Act was ripe even before the 
Act had taken effect. Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 92 P.3d 1063 (2002). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has likewise made clear that a plaintiff need not wait for the threatened injury to 
occur before seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. 
Union, 442 U.S. 289,298 ( 1979). 
Yet in this case, the district court held that Plaintiffs had not established that there are 
"definite, concrete issues and a real, substantial controversy" because none of Plaintiffs' criminal 
cases had concluded. R., p. 493. The lower court believed thus that ·'the nature and extent of any 
real or permanent injury cannot be determined at this time." R., p. 494. This analysis is flawed 
for at least four reasons. First, the court was wrong that none of Plaintiffs' criminal cases had 
concluded. See Part IV.B.1.a, above. Second, a plaintiff need not wait for the threatened injury to 
occur before seeking declaratory or injunctive relief. E.g., Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298. Indeed, the 
Court made clear in Ex parte Young itself that defense against criminal proceedings by claiming 
a constitutional violation is not an adequate remedy, because of the gravity of the potential 
penalty and because the ability to prove the violation in a criminal court "falls so far below that 
which would obtain in a court of equity that comparison is scarcely possible." 209 U.S. 123, 165 
(1908). The even graver risk here-one that actually happened to the lead plaintiff in this case-
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is that ongoing denial of counsel, especially to a criminal defendant awaiting trial in jail. will 
effectively coerce a guilty plea. 
Third, as explained above, the district court's conclusion relies on a case-by-case analysis 
under Strickland and ignores the pre-adjudication injuries alleged by Plaintiffs under Cronic. In 
other words, given the state of Idaho's indigent defense system, the present circumstances are "so 
I ikely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particuiar case is 
unjustified." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. Plaintiffs have specifically alleged definite and concrete 
facts suggesting that the public defense system in Idaho is broken and in need of an urgent and 
system-wide overhaul. The State itself has acknowledged the seriousness of Plaintiffs 
allegations, R., p. 161, as has the district court, R., p. 492. 
Fourth, none of Plaintiffs' allegations are hypothetical. The deficiencies described in the 
Complaint are longstanding and have been recognized by state officials at every level. Indeed, it 
is the recognition of those deficiencies that led to the state-requested assessment conducted by 
the NLADA, R., p. 20, para. 31, the creation of the CJC's Public Defense Subcommittee, R., p. 
24, para. 45, the establishment of a legislative study committee, R., p. 24, para. 45., and 
legislative efforts to reform the system in 2014 and 2016, see R., p. 24, para. 45, including the 
creation of the PDC, which was tasked with "creating rules regarding training and education of 
defense attorneys and making recommendations to the legislature for improving public defense 
in Idaho." R., p. 485. Plaintiffs also identified definite and concrete legal issues in the Complaint. 
These include "[w]hether the State's failure to adequately fund and supervise the delivery of 
indigent-defense services impedes the provision of effective legal representation to indigent 
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defendants," "[w]hether the State's failure to develop uniform workload and performance 
standards for public-defense attorneys in Idaho impedes the provision of effective legal 
representation to indigent defendants," and, whether the structure of the statewide system and the 
State's failure to appropriately fund, supervise, and administer the county-level systems violates 
the right to counsel guarantees in the United States and Idaho constitutions. R., p. 35, para. 91. 
As for the final prong of the ripeness inquiry, there is undoubtedly a present need for 
adjudication, given that thousands of indigent defendants across the state-including the named 
plaintiffs-continue to receive constitutionally-deficient representation as a result of Idaho's 
broken system. It is incumbent upon the courts to step in and ensure that the State addresses 
these ongoing injuries. 
3. The Separation of Powers Doctrine Does Not Apply in This Case. 
The decision below also reaches the startling conclusion that Idaho's courts are powerless 
to remedy statewide, systemic constitutional violations occurring daily in Idaho courtrooms. In 
fact, the district court concluded that our courts will not even take evidence to determine whether 
there is a statewide, systemic problem to start with. It decided that even to determine whether 
Defendants are violating their direct, statutory and constitutional responsibilities would "invade 
the province of the legislature" and "usurp the duties of the PDC." R., p. 496,492. 
That is wrong. As this Court very recently reminded, "courts must refuse to aid and abet . 
. . violations of the constitution." Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Lawrence Denney, No. 43169, 2015 WL 
7421342, at * 14 (Idaho Nov. 20, 2015). "Thus, this Court has recognized that it has the power to 
review the legislature's actions to ensure that they comply with constitutional requirements and 
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that it is this Court's duty to remedy any violations.'' Id. Plaintiffs have alleged here that 
thousands of Idahoans are being denied a fundamental constitutional right "as a result of the 
State's failure to provide the necessary resources, robust oversight, and specialized training 
required to ensure that ali public defenders can handle all of their cases effectiveiy and in 
compliance with state and federal law." R., p. 12, para. 8. In addition to the constructive denial of 
counsel claims discussed above, Plaintiffs specifically alleged ongoing, actual denials of counsel 
at critical stages of the proceedings. R., p. 13-14, para. 11-12 Plaintiffs alleged, with 
particularity, that these ongoing constitutional violations are due to failures at the state level that 
the individual counties alone cannot remedy. R., p. 38., para., p. 12, para. I 02, p. 55, para. 102-
69, p. 26, para. 173, p. 57, para. 176, 180, p. 57, 183; cf p. 13, para. 12, p. 21, para. 36, p. 24, 
para. 44, 46, 47, 48, p. 25, para. 49, 52, 54, p. 26, para. 57, 58, p. 33, para. 85, 86, 87, p. 34, para. 
91, p. 36, para. 96 .. 
The Idaho judiciary has a special and urgent responsibility to stop these ongoing 
violations. Idaho's separation of powers doctrine has never been applied to avoid a constitutional 
question that the Constitution has not explicitly assigned to another branch's exclusive 
discretion. And never, this Court has made clear, may Idaho courts excuse themselves, on 
separation of powers grounds, from examining the alleged violation of constitutionally protected 
individual rights. The political branches have no discretion to violate those rights. 
a. Separation of Powers in Idaho. 
The Idaho Constitution divides the powers of government of this state into the "three 
distinct departments" of the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches. Idaho Const. 
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Art. IJ, § I. This Court, more than 110 years ago, observed that, because of that separation of 
powers, Idaho courts could not prohibit other branches from acting within the scope of their 
exclusive domains. See Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 452-55, 75 P. 246, 255 (1904). "[O]n the 
other hand," the Court expiained, "the iegal effect of such action after it has been taken may be 
inquired into by the court." ld.,at 454, 75 P. at 255; accord Balderston v. Brady, 17 Idaho 567, 
576, I 07 P. 493,495 (1910). 
In the century since then, this Court has not hesitated to conduct those sorts of searching 
inquiries. In the rare instance where our Constitution vests a particular branch with exclusive 
discretion over a specific determination, the courts will not look behind the discretionary call 
itself. But even in those unusual cases, the courts still retain their special role and authority to 
examine and ensure the constitutionality of those decisions. "The question is whether this Court, 
by entertaining review of a particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of 
another coordinate branch of government, when the matter was one proper(v entrusted to that 
branch." Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P. 2d at 761 ( emphasis added). The 
rare cases in which this has actually come up illustrate how these peculiar scenarios-where a 
matter is entrusted exclusively to another branch-are a world apart from this case, which seeks 
to vindicate a fundamental individual right: 
• Diefendorf v. Gallet: Article IV, § 9, of the Idaho Constitution expressly assigns 
to ·'[t]he governor" discretion so that he "may" convene the legislature for a special 
session by proclamation. Article III, § 15, likewise expressly grants discretion to "the 
house where [a] bill may be pending" so that it "may" dispense with reading the bill three 
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times before passage. Thus, when the governor acted within his '·exclusive province'' to 
convene a special legislative session, and when the legislature took the "purely legislative 
act" of skipping the extra readings, the Court had no authority to review those 
discretionary calls. 51 Idaho 619,638,639, 10 P.2d 307,315 (1932).6 
• Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy: Article III, § 22, contains a '·clear ... textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment to the legislature of the issue of determining 
whether a sufficient emergency exists to necessitate immediate effectuation of 
legislation." 110 Idaho 691, 695, 718 P.2d 1129, 1133 (l 986). Accordingly, the Court held 
that it could not interfere with "the reasonable exercise by the legislature of powers 
expressly delegated to it by the constitution of this state," absent some other 
constitutional violation. Id. at 696, 1134. 
• Troutner v. Kempthorne: Article IV, § 6, which commits to the Idaho Senate the 
discretion to grant or deny consent to a governor's nominee, "gives the Senate the sole 
authority to pass upon the nominee's qualifications." 142 Idaho 389, 393, 128 P.3d 926, 
930 (2006). Because of the express textual commitment of discretion to another branch. 
this Court determined that it would not look behind the Senate's confirmation of a 
nominee. Id. 
6 Another case from the same era, Johnson v. Diefendm:f; 56 Idaho 620, 57 P.2d I 068 (1936), is 
sometimes cited alongside Gallet in discussions of the separation of powers doctrine. But 
Johnson is actually not a case in which the Court declined review on separation of powers 
grounds. Rather, because both sides stipulated that a legislative emergency did exist in that case, 
the question whether the legislature or the courts got to make the final call about the existence of 
an emergency was not before the Court. Id. 56 Idaho at 638, 57 P.2d at 1076. 
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On the other hand, absent express, textually demonstrable assignments of discretion to a 
non-judicial branch, this Court has again and again refused to avoid a constitutional question on 
separation of powers grounds: 
• Ingard v. Baker: Although the governor had constitutional discretion in selecting 
nominees for public offices, the Court still reviewed the governor's nomination because a 
statute limited that discretion. 27 Idaho 124, 138, 147 P. 293,298 (1915). Where the law 
overlaid a duty upon that discretion, even so slight a duty as to consider an executive 
agency's recommendations before making a nomination, the Court still intervened to 
ensure the governor complied with that duty. Id. 
• Miles v. Idaho Power Co.: Again, because of legal duties overlying the political 
branches' discretion, the Court intervened to review the Swan Falls Agreement between 
the State and Idaho Power. 116 Idaho 635, 640, 778 P.2d 757, 762 (1989). This Court 
held that, although the advisability of the agreement itself was a discretionary call for the 
legislative and executive branches, deciding whether the agreement violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment and counterpart guarantees in the Idaho Constitution was "a 
fundamental responsibility of the judiciary." Id. 
• ISEEO v. Evans (ISEEO /): Even when faced with vague constitutional duties 
calling for complicated interpretation, this Court will not defer to the political branches 
when it comes to individual rights. 123 Idaho at 583, 850 P.2d at 734. This Court 
acknowledged that it was "not well equipped to legislate in a turbulent field of social, 
economic and political policy" in figuring out what the Idaho Constitution meant by a 
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.. thorough" public education. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) But the Court 
nevertheless held that it would be "an abject abdication of [its] role in the American 
system of government" to avoid the difficult task by invoking the separation of powers 
doctrine. Id. 
• In re SRBA Case No. 39576: This Court reversed a lower court's conclusion that 
the separation of powers doctrine foreclosed judicial decision of whether state agencies 
could appear separately in the Snake River Basin Adjudication. 128 Idaho 246, 260-61, 
912 P.2d 614, 628-29 (1995). Looking to the factors involved in the federal "political 
question doctrine," laid out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the Court found 
no justification for avoiding judicial review, especially because of the due process issues 
implicated. In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261,912 P.2d at 629. 
• Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Denney: This recent case involved the "validity of 
enactments," one of the categories identified in Baker v. Carr as often raising separation 
of powers issues. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 214. This Court noted the separation of 
powers expressed in Article II, section I, of the Idaho Constitution, but explained that it is 
nevertheless "axiomatic that each of the branches of government serves as a check 
against the powers of the others to ensure that each branch is acting within the scope of 
its authority and consistent with the Constitution." Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 
7421342 at* 13. The Court accordingly mandated constitutional compliance in the face of 
executive branch inaction. Id. at * 18. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF -Page 38 
As these cases demonstrate, the separation of powers doctrine rarely justifies withholding 
judicial review, whether in federal or in Idaho courts. The district court erred in applying the 
doctrine to preclude review of Plaintiffs claims in this case. 
b. Complying with the Sixth Amendment and Article I, § 13, of the Idaho 
Constitution is Not a Discretionary Act. 
The main principle to be distilled from the precedent set forth above is that the separation 
of powers doctrine only limits judicial review of other branches' discretionary acts. In re SRBA 
Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629. Where the Constitution has removed 
discretion, the doctrine obviously does not apply. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at 
* 14. The very purpose of the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Rights in Article I of Idaho's 
Constitution is to eliminate the political branches' discretion and instead entrust the protection of 
individual rights to an independent judiciary. See West Virginia S'tate Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624,638 (1943). Judge Donald Burnett, in his scholarly and concise way, explained this 
principle: 
Our system of government is said to embody a separation of powers. Actually, it 
is more accurate to say that the three branches of government-legislative, 
executive and judicial-have areas of exclusive and shared authority. Thus, the 
legislature has exclusive authority, subject to constitutional restrictions, to 
determine the internal processes by which it will formulate and consider proposed 
statutes or resolutions. Similarly, the judiciary has exclusive authority, within 
constitutional constraints, to determine the internal processes by which it will 
perform fact-finding and law-stating functions of adjudication. These areas of 
exclusive responsibility often are characterized as "procedure." On the other hand, 
the legislature and judiciary share authority to define the rights and duties of 
private persons vis-a-vis each other or of government vis-a-vis individuals. On 
such issues, court rules or decisions may coexist with statutes so long as they do 
not conflict. When there is a conflict, the judiciary defers to the legislature unless 
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the issue is governed by the state or federal constitution. In that event the 
judiciary 's constitutional interpretation will prevail. 
State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 785-786, 735 P.2d I 089, 1096-97 (Ct. App. 1987) (Burnett, J., 
concurring) ( emphasis added). 
This Court does not have to look any further than Gideon v. Wainwright for confirmation 
that the right to counsel is a fundamental right with respect to which the political branches have 
no discretion to fall short. Assistance of counsel, the Gideon Court held, "is one of the safeguards 
of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and 
liberty.'' 372 U.S. 335, 343 (internal citation omitted). Presented with Florida's failure to 
establish and fund an adequate system of providing counsel, the Gideon Court interpreted the 
Constitution to nevertheless require it notwithstanding concerns of federalism and separation of 
powers. The Court's decision required immediate, statewide action in Florida to remedy a sudden 
constitutional crisis of daunting magnitude. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 
1963) ( discussing remedies in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision). The counterpart to the 
Sixth Amendment in Idaho's Constitution, at Article I, section 13, is likewise a fundamental, 
individual right-not an exclusive or discretionary function of some other co-ordinate branch. 
See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 7, 539 P.2d 556, 559 ( 1975); Bement v. State, 91 Idaho 388, 
395, 422 P.2d 55, 62 ( 1966) ( describing the right to counsel as "so important" that it is "the most 
pervasive right of an accused" (internal citation omitted)). 
There is, obviously, no "textually demonstrable commitment" of exclusive discretion 
over this fundamental right in either the Sixth Amendment or the Idaho Constitution. See Idaho 
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State AFL-CIO, 110 Idaho at 695, 718 P.2d at 1133. Instead, the text that guarantees the right to 
counsel in both constitutions alludes, if anything, to the judiciary. Nor does the fundamental right 
to counsel implicate the "political question doctrine" of Baker v. Carr, which is concerned with 
questions that demonstrably fall within another branch's competence, such as foreign relations, 
the guaranty of a "republican" form of government, and the status of Indian tribes. 369 U.S. at 
211-19; see also State v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 32 P.3d 325, 331-37 (Wyo. 200 I) (analyzing, 
at great length, the separation of powers and political question doctrines to explain why judicial 
review in cases alleging ongoing, statewide constitutional violations ·'is entirely consistent with 
separation of powers and the judicial role.") Separation of powers and the political question 
doctrine cannot be used as end-runs around judicial protection of constitutional rights. As the 
Baker CoUJi itself explained, "such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an 
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right," for "[i]t is inconceivable that 
guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of 
existence." 369 U.S. 186,231,230 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,345 (1960)). 
The right to counsel is simply not a matter "properly entrusted to [some] other branch." 
See Miles, 116 Idaho at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. This Court does not defer to another branch's 
determination of constitutional adequacy absent a textually demonstrable assignment of 
discretion to that branch. See In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho at 261, 912 P.2d at 629. 
Even where the Constitution expressly delegates authority to another branch, the separation of 
powers doctrine still does not absolve this Court of its fundamental responsibility to examine and 
decide complaints alleging the violation of individual rights. See Miles, 116 Idaho at 640, 778 
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P.2d at 762. The Complaint in this case raises serious questions involving fundamental individual 
rights outside the discretion of any particular branch of government. Accordingly, the lower 
court's dismissal on separation of powers grounds must be reversed. 
c. A Declaration and Injunction in This Case Would Respect Executive and 
Legislative Independence. 
In its separation of powers analysis, the district court expressed misplaced concern about 
.. overrid[ing]" the indigent defense system that the legislature had chosen, and about 
.. reshap[ing] the system of indigent criminal defense in Idaho." R., p. 496. As a threshold matter, 
this is more properly characterized as a redressability issue, which this brief covers in Part 
IV.B.1.c. It is not truly a separation of powers issue because, as this Court has explained in its 
own separation of powers decisions, the judiciary has a fundamental responsibility to override 
other branches' failures to act and to remediate unconstitutional state systems. See Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at *14; ISEEO I, 123 Idaho at 583-84, 850 P.2d at 734-35; ISEEO v. 
Evans, 142 Idaho 450, 459, 129 P.3d 1199, 1208 (2005) [hereinafter ISEEO V]; see also Hellar v. 
Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 575, 585, 682 P.2d 524, 528, 538 (1984) (upholding declaratory 
judgment invalidating legislative reapportionment and entering an order prescribing a specific 
reapportionment plan). 
In any event, the district court's worry about invading the province of the legislature by 
overriding the existing system is an imagined one. By design, the remedy that Plaintiffs seek 
respects the separation of powers. Plaintiffs ask for a declaratory judgment that Idaho's system 
violates the right to counsel. R., p. 25, para. 53. Entering a declaration obviously does not require 
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the court to "establish standards or guidelines,'' to "mandate" that any branch '·must enact ... 
legislation, ordinances, or rules to meet those standards," or to order any branch to "provide 
adequate funding therefore." R., p. 497. Rather, entering a declaration to resolve a question of 
constitutionality is a core judicial branch duty. ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 459, 129 P.3d at 1208. 
Plaintiffs also seek an injunction requiring that the State develop and propose a plan to 
implement a constitutional system. R., p. 25, para. 53. This remedy similarly would not require 
the Court to impose standards, mandate enactment of legislation, or order appropriation of 
additional funding. In crafting a constitutional system, the executive and legislative branches 
would retain the full discretion preserved for them by the separation of powers. They, not the 
courts, would develop Idaho-appropriate standards on their own. They, not the courts, would 
determine whether new legislation would be best or whether, instead, the Governor and the PDC 
would use their existing authority to impose reforms. See, e.g., LC. § 19-850 ( effective July 1, 
2016) (granting PDC authority to promulgate rules establishing standards for public defense); 
Idaho Exec. Order No. 2015-11 (Oct. I, 2015) (tasking executive branch commission with 
"ensur[ing] compliance" by local jurisdictions with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Act, including through "remedial actions for violations"); Idaho Exec. Order no. 2016-0 I (Jan. 
28, 2016) (granting an executive branch council an "expanded role" beyond its statutory 
authority and tasking it with the duty of"[ a]lign[ing] policy and funding systems"). They, not the 
courts, would decide whether these measures would require additional funding, the realignment 
of existing funding, or whether to avoid funding issues altogether by measures to reduce the 
overall case load of the entire criminal justice system, thus alleviating the burdens of prosecutors, 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF Page 43 
the courts, and public defenders alike. 7 Further, as Ne,v York's highest court recognized in 
Hurrell-Harring, the fact that the court's ruling may necessitate some action on the part of the 
legislature does not absolve the court from issuing such a ruling: 
It is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would necessitate the 
appropriation of funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, some 
reordering of legislative priorities. But this does not amount to an argument upon 
which a court might be relieved of its essential obligation to provide a remedy for 
violation of a fundamental constitutional right. 
Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 227 (citing A1arbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1803)). 
The executive and legislative branches would, in every event, retain their independence. 
The court would do nothing more than exercise its unique and critical role to make the ultimate 
determination of constitutional compliance and enter any appropriate orders to set the other 
branches into motion to correct deficiencies. This Court can assume that after it "fulfill[ s] [its] 
constitutional duty to interpret the constitution the other branches of government also will carry 
out their defined constitutional duties in good faith and in a completely responsible manner." 
ISEEO I, 123 Idaho at 583, 850 P.2d at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Furthermore, because the right to counsel directly involves the judiciary in its ongoing 
supervision of the criminal justice system, it is inconceivable that the courts have no role in 
7 A Pennsylvania state court case involving county-level indigent defense was dismissed in part 
on separation of powers grounds. Flora v. Luzerne Cty., I 03 A.3d 125, 138 (Pa. 2014). The 
plaintiffs in that case, however, sought a writ of mandamus explicitly requiring appropriation of 
additional funding to the Office of Public Defender. Id. Plaintiffs in this case seek neither an 
extraordinary writ nor an order expressly requiring appropriation of funds. See R., p. 25, para. 
53. Moreover, the Pennsylvania decision is questionable authority, as the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has granted special permission for appeal, which is now pending. Flora v. Luzerne Cty. 
118 A.3d 385 (Pa. 2015). 
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policing the ongoing constitutionality of that system. Rather, this Court has an enhanced 
responsibility to take remedial action in this case, which involves the daily activity before courts 
throughout Idaho. The judiciary's responsibility is so direct and special when it comes to the 
right to counsel that this Court could take remedial action on its own. See Gideon, 153 So. 2d at 
300 (promptly adopting procedural rules to aid in compliance with the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Gideon); In the Matter of the Adoption of New Standards fi>r Indigent Defense and 
Certification of Compliance, No. 25700-A-1004 (Wash. June 15, 2012), 
This Court has made clear, as courts across this country have done since Marbury v. 
lvfadison was decided in 1803, that the legislature and governor are not the final arbiters of 
whether their acts or omissions are constitutional. See Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 2015 WL 7421342 at 
* 14. Though the Idaho Constitution prescribes a separation of powers, whenever there is a 
constitutional violation, whether done "perversely" or by "honest mistake," "the remedy for such 
violation exists, nevertheless." Id. Here, neither the Legislature nor the Governor can be allowed 
to be the final arbiter of whether Idaho's public defense system is constitutional. 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined that Governor Otter and the Members of 
the Idaho Public Defense Commission Are Proper Defendants in This Case. 
The burden lies with the State of Idaho, not individual counties, to make certain that 
indigent defendants' right to competent counsel is realized. The district court agreed: 
"Unquestionably, the State is ultimately responsible for ensuring constitutionally-sound public 
defense." R., p. 472. Because the State is ultimately responsible for protecting the right to 
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counsel, the question is which state officials can be sued when the State fails to meet its 
constitutional obligation under the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13. Under the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Young, state officials sued in their official capacities for 
prospective or declaratory relief are not immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. Such officials may be liable so long as they have '·some 
connection" to the enforcement or operation of the law in question. Id. Appellants named 
Governor Otter and the members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission as defendants in this 
case, because they have a direct and significant connection to the provision of public defense 
services across this state, and have specific authority to take further steps to reform this state's 
public defender system and bring it into compliance with the state and federal constitutions. 
Here, even the district court agreed, concluding that "[ u ]nder the Ex parte Young 
doctrine, the Court finds that the Governor and the PDC members have a more than sufficiently 
close connection or nexus to the enforcement of public defense in Idaho." R., p. 485. 
Specifically, the court correctly pointed out that "[t]he Governor has a duty to ensure that the 
Constitution and laws are enforced in Idaho. The Governor also has direct supervisory authority 
over those responsible to establish standards for a constitutionally sound public defense system." 
R., p. 485. The lower court also recognized the PDC's specific responsibility for creating training 
and education rules and for recommending improvements to the legislature. R., p. 485. Most 
importantly, the lower court correctly rejected the argument that the legislature's delegation of 
public defender services to the counties abdicates the Defendants' responsibility to indigent 
defendants in Idaho. Id. 
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The State's, Governor's, and PDC's authority over public defense reform, and their 
attendant ability to remedy the systemic deficiencies alleged in this case, has further increased in 
the months since Plaintiffs filed suit. Defendant Otter, by his signature, enacted 2016 House Bill 
504, which will empower the PDC to promulgate and enforce specific standards for the provision 
of public defense services and will also require the PDC to monitor and evaluate whether each 
individual county complies with those standards. I.C. § 19-850(1 )(a)(vii) ( effective July 1, 2016). 
The principles underlying those standards track the deficiencies that Plaintiffs identified in their 
Complaint. See R., p. 3 7, para. 101. When and whether the PDC promulgates and enforces new 
standards remains to be seen, but the enactment of House Bill 504 resolves any doubt that the 
PDC and Governor have more than enough authority to remedy the Plaintiffs' grievances. 
Governor Otter also allocated, and the Legislature appropriated, over $5 million of State 
funding for trial-level public defense delivery across the state. See 2016 House Bill 609, 
http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/20 I 6/H0609.htm. Though this funding will not 
nearly be sufficient to remediate this state's public defense system, the allocation does 
demonstrate the Governor's authority to take concrete steps to reform the system. 
The PDC, in turn, will now also have authority to provide some of this limited funding to 
the counties to assist them in meeting the statutory requirements. I.C. § I 9-862A ( effective July 
1, 2016). In the event that any county is unable or unwilling to take the steps necessary to come 
into compliance with the statutory requirements, the PDC is ultimately responsible for 
intervening and ensuring that the standards are met. LC. § I 9-862A( 11) ( effective July 1, 2016). 
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The PDC will even have the power to intercept county sales tax revenue to fund failing county-
level indigent defense systems. LC. § l 9-862A(l 2) ( effective July 1, 2016). 
These steps are not enough to guarantee that Idaho's public defense system passes 
constitutional muster. The passage of this most recent legislation does not guarantee that the 
system-wide deficiencies will be adequately addressed, particularly given the State's recent 
history of enacting public defense legislation and then failing to carry out its statutory 
responsibilities. The most recent legislation does clearly demonstrate, however, that the PDC and 
the Governor had (and have) the ability to provide Plaintiffs with appropriate relief. Each 
defendant in this case was and is connected to Idaho's public defense system and each is 
responsible for ensuring that it is up to constitutional standards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, this Court should reverse the lower court's decision dismissing 
ading stage and remand so Plaintiffs can put on their proof. 
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Judgment debtor failed to appear. 
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Judgment: 
Money damages D Default D Other entered in the amount of: 
---------
Principal Interest $ 
----
Costs $ 
----
Attorney fees $ Total $ __ _ 
D Claim of exemption D granted D denied. Court orders withholdings modified to $ ___ per __ _ 
Further, court orders: 
D Monies held by levying officer to be D released to judgment creditor. D returned to judgment debtor. 
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D Notice to be filed within 15 days. D Restitution of Premises 
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Re: 
Hearing Date: 
Motion: 
Tentative Ruling: 
Tentative Ruling 
Phillips et al. v. State of California et al., Superior Court 
Case No. 15CECG02201 
April 12, 2016 (Dept. 501) 
( 1) State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, 
Jr.'s Demurrer 
(2) State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, 
Jr.'s Motion to Strike 
(3) County of Fresno's Demurrer 
(1) State of Callfornla and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. 's Demurrer. 
To sustain the demurrer to the petition and the entire complaint as to 
Governor Brown, with leave to amend. 
As to the State of California, to sustain the demurrer to the petition for writ 
of mandate, with leave to amend. To sus.tain the demurrer to the fifth cause of 
action with leave to amend. To overrule t.he demurrers to the first, second, third, 
fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc.§ 
430.10.) 
(2) State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. 's Motion to Strike. 
To deny. {Code Civ. Proc. § 435.) 
(3) County of Fresno's Demurrer. To sustain the demurrer to the petition for 
writ of mandate, with leave to amend. To overrule the demurrers to the 
complaint and each cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10.) 
Plaintiffs are granted 20 days leave to file the first amended petition and 
complaint. The time in which the pleading can be amended will run from 
service by the clerk of the minute order. New allegations in the amended 
pleading are to be set in boldface type. The parties shall meet and confer in 
accordance with Code Civ. Proc.§ 430.41 (c). 
In the amended pleading, plaintiffs shall separate and clearly distinguish 
between the petition for writ of mandate and the complaint. The two should be 
pied separately as independent pleadings, even if bound together in one 
document. 
Explanation: 
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State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr. 's Demurrer 
Plaintiffs in this action filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint 
("Complaint") against County of Fresno, the State of California and Governor 
Brown, alleging that the Fresno County Public Defender's Office suffers from 
systemic and structural deficiencies that prevent it from providing indigent 
defendants with meaningful and effective assistance of counsel in violation of 
the federal and California constitutional guarantees of due process and right to 
counsel, and the constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. 
The State of California and Governor Brown will be referred to herein 
collectively as "the State." 
The State's responslblllty 
Plaintiffs allege that the State has a "constitutional duty to run indigent 
defense systems" (Complaint ,i 27); has delegated that duty to the counties; and 
that the State "does not provide oversight" of the county systems and "leaves 
counties to shoulder the financial costs." (Id. ,i,i 27, 29. 31.J 
The State contends that the right to counsel does not prescribe any 
affirmative duty on the State government to provide or run a particular indigent 
defense system or distribution of government powers. (See, e.g., Marine Forests 
Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th l, 30 ["The [federal] 
Constitution does not impose on the States any particular plan for the distribution 
of governmental powers;" citation omitted].) The State asserts that even if the 
right to counsel placed an affirmative duty on the State government, the 
Legislature has enacted a comprehensive system of indigent defense laws, 
which safeguard the right to counsel. (See, e.g .• Avon v. Municipal Court for Los 
Angeles Judicial Dist. (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 630, 632 ["The purpose of section 987a 
[renumbered 987.2] of the Penal Code is to provide adequate representation for 
indigent persons charged with crime]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal. 3d 334, 
344 [the constitutional right to counsel "is satisfied in California by the statutory 
provision for the assignment of counsel by the court"].) 
The State may be correct that Pen. Code§ 987.2 provides an effective 
backstop to the right to counsel. But at the pleading stage the court cannot 
determine that this system operates to provide effective assistance of counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants. 
The State contends that the Complaint does not allege that the State 
failed to perform any specific statutory duty, and thus plaintiffs cannot allege a 
cognizable as-applied claim against the State. 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a provision of the Bill of Rights so 
'"fundamental and essential to a fair trial"' that it "is made obligatory upon the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment." (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 
2 
335, 342-43, emphasis added.) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause in turn provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law." (US. Const, amend XIV (emphasis 
added).) 
The State argues that that the Fourteenth Amendment's reference to the 
"State" does not does not place the responsibility for providing counsel on state 
governments because the term the "State" refers to all public entities within the 
states, at both the state and local levels, citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Dept. of Social Services (1989} 489 U.S. 189, 195fn. 1. 
That is not a holding of the DeShaney decision. The Court stated that that 
the petitioners in that case "contend that the State [1] deprived Joshua of his 
liberty interest ... " Footnote 1 reads, "As used here, the term 'State' refers 
generically to state and local governmental entities and their agents." The Court 
was merely defining the term as used in that opinion. It was not stating that the 
term "State" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment refers generically to state 
and local government entities. As the State points out in its reply brief, Gideon 
did not address where the responsibility lies within states for providing counsel." 
"It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered." 
(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 566.) The State cites to City of Lafayette, 
La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (1978) 435 U.S. 389,415 fn. 43 for the same 
proposition. This citation is not on point either. 
The State cannot disclaim its constitutional responsibilities merely because 
it has delegated such responsibilities to its municipalities. (See Duncan v. 
Michigan (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) 774 N.W.2d 89, 97-98, 104-105.) In New York Cty. 
Lawyers' Ass 'n v. State of New York (N .Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) 745 N.Y.S.2d 376,381, 
the court issued a preliminary injunction in a case challenging New York's 
compensation rate for appointed counsel and citing Gideon for the proposition 
that "New York State bears the ultimate responsibility to provide counsel to the 
indigent." 
Nor can the State evade its constitutional obligation by passing statutes. 
(See Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. 2010) 622 F.3d 1058, 107 4 ["a State 
cannot avoid its obligation under federal law by contracting with a third party to 
perform its function"].) Counties are "subordinate governmental instrumentalities 
created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental 
functions," rather than "sovereign entities." (Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 
575.) 
Plaintiffs point to Stanley v. Darlington County School Dist. {4th Cir. 1996) 84 
F.3d 707, an equal protection school desegregation case, where the State 
argued that "the School District lacks standing to sue the State because the 
School District is a political subdivision of the State and that the State's allocation 
of governmental expenses is an internal issue of governmental structuring and 
money." (Id. at pp. 712-713.) The court rejected this argument, stating, 
"[b]ecause the Fourteenth Amendment imposes direct responsibility on a state 
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to ensure [due process] ... a state's delegation to a political subdivision of the 
power necessary to remedy the constitutional violation does not absolve the 
state of its responsibility to ensure that the violation is remedied." (Id. at p. 713.J 
The State, here, distinguishes Stanley by pointing out that the decision did 
not place responsibility upon states for violations by other governmental entities. 
The court recognized "[a]t the outset of our discussion ... that illegal segregation 
was for many years the policy of both the State of South Carolina and the 
Darlington County School District." (/d. at p. 713.) 
However, here, if the State created an indigent defense system that is 
systematically flawed and underfunded, Stanley indicates that the State remains 
responsible, even if it delegated this responsibility to political subdivisions. "Even 
if a state gives its local school districts the power and means to remedy" 
segregation, it can still be sued by the students in those districts for its failure to 
take steps to dismantle a dual educational system that it created. (/d. at p. 713.) 
The State has not produced authority clearly showing that the causes of 
action premised on deprivation of the right to counsel have no merit. The court 
will not sustain the demurrer on this ground. 
Violation of Individual's Right to Counsel 
The State next argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim for violation 
of any individual's right to counsel. 
The State contends that plaintiffs must satisfy the test set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-94: in order to 
prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) 
that an error by counsel was professionally unreasonable and (2) that there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different (i.e., prejudice). 
However, plaintiffs in this action are not challenging individual convictions. 
Rather, they claim 'that the State systematically deprives Fresno County indigent 
defendants of the right to counsel. They contend that this right can be 
vindicated through individual suits challenging the validity of particular criminal 
convictions, or suits seeking prospective systemic relief where structural 
deficiencies in an indigent defense system constructively deny the assistance of 
· counsel. 
Since no individual convictions are being challenged, the court will only 
address the question of whether there is a claim of systemic deprivation . 
. Plaintiffs correctly point out that mere token appointment of counsel does 
not satisfy the Sixth amendment right to counsel. (Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 
387, 395.) "The Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel at 
4 
critical stages of a criminal proceeding." (Lafler v. Cooper {2012) 132 S.Ct. 137 6, 
1385.J 
Systemic violations of the right to counsel can be remedied through 
prospective relief. The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 
335, held that states are obligated under the Fourteenth Amendment to appoint 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants. In Luckey v. Harris (11th Cir. 1988) 860 
F.2d 1012, the Eleventh Circuit held that Strickland is an inappropriate standard 
to apply in a civil suit seeking prospective relief. The court distinguished between 
the standard used to determine "whether an accused has been prejudiced by 
the denial of a right," which is an issue "that relates to relief," and the question of 
"whether such a right exists and can be protected prospectively." (/d. at p. 
l 017, emphasis added.) The court emphasized that prospective relief is 
designed to avoid future harm; as such, "it can protect constitutional rights, even 
if the violation of these rights would not affect the outcome of a trial." (Id.) 
Prospective relief is designed to avoid future harm. [Citation.] 
Therefore, it can protect constitutional rights, even if the violation of 
these rights would not affect the outcome of a trial. 
(/d. at p. 1017.) 
In a suit for prospective relief the plaintiff's burden is to show the 
likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the 
inadequacy of remedies at law .... This is the standard to which 
appellants, as a class, should have been held. 
(Id. at p. 1018 (internal quotations omitted).) 
Addressing the sufficiency of the allegations, the appellate court noted: 
Appellants have alleged that systemic delays in the appointment 
of counsel deny them their sixth amendment right to the 
representation of counsel at critical stages in the criminal process, 
hamper the ability of their counsel to defend them, and effectively 
deny them their eighth and fourteenth amendment right to bail, 
that their attorneys are denied investigative and expert resources 
necessary to defend them effectively, that their attorneys are 
pressured by courts to hurry their case to trial or to enter a guilty 
plea, and that they are denied equal protection of the law~. 
Without passing on the merits of these allegations, we conclude 
that they are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 
(Id. at p. 1018.) 
Here, plaintiffs allege similar systemic deficiencies: excessive caseloads 
(Complaint ,i,i 4, 50-52); Case management practices that create conflicts of 
interest for attorneys (Complaint ,i,i 54, 58-59, 80); inadequate resources 
(Complaint ,i,i 69, 75, 78-79, 82); inadequate supervision (Complaint ,i 95). 
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Plaintiffs allege that these deficiencies cause the indigent defense system to 
provide for representation that falls below minimum Constitutional and statutory 
standards through inadequate preparation (Complaint ,i,i 54, 63, 80, 87-88); lack 
of conflict-free legal representation (Complaint ,i,i 36, 48, 54, 64, 66-71, 79, 80, 95, 
112); lack of continuous representation (Complaint ,i 63); inadequate 
opportunity for consultation (Complaint ,i,i 64, 66, 68, 69-71 J; interference with 
competent representation due to inadequate training and support from 
supervisors (Complaint ,i,i 53, 60, 74, 75, 95, 97); inadequate factual investigation 
(Complaint ,i,i 78-80); lack of meaningful adversarial testing (Complaint ,i,i 85, 
87}. 
Pursuant to Luckey, plaintiffs need not plead and prove the elements of 
ineffective assistance as to specific individuals in order to state a cause of 
action. 
The State relies on Heck v. Humphrey (1994} 512 U.S. 477, 486, which held 
that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff seeking to collaterally 
attack a criminal conviction, and that apart from habeas, civil actions "are not 
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal 
judgments." 
The suit in Heck was brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for damages. 
The Court held that to maintain a section 1983 suit for damages, the plaintiff must 
prove that the conviction was invalidated. (Id. at pp. 486-487.) Heck does not 
apply here because plaintiffs do not seek damages or relief that would imply the 
invalidity of any convictions; rather they seek purely prospective relief. 
Professional Guidelin~s 
The State argues that alleged violations of professional guidelines are 
insufficient to state a claim for violation of right to counsel. The State points out 
that professional guidelines and norms such as those discussed in the Complaint 
are not themselves constitutional standards or minimums, but are only guides to 
determining what is reasonable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 
688.) 
However, the Complaint does not hold these guidelines and standards 
out as inexorable commands, but as evidence and guidelines. As indicated by 
Strickland, cited by the State, professional guidelines and norms are relevant, 
even if not dispositive. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688 [Prevailing norms of 
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ... are 
guides to determining what is reasonable ... "].) 
Penal Code§ 987 (count S) 
The fifth cause of action, asserting violation of Penal Code section 987, 
fails against the State because the statute does not impose any duty on the 
State. The statute provides that if a criminal defendant desires and is unable to 
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employ counsel, "the court shall assign counsel to defend him or her." (Pen. 
Code§ 987(0).} 
The only entity on whom a duty is imposed by section 987 is the court. 
And it only requires that counsel be assigned to defend the defendant. The 
Complaint does not allege any instance in which a court was required to 
appoint counsel but failed to do so. Plaintiffs offer no argument as to how this 
statute was violated. The demurrer to the fifth cause of action with leave to 
amend. 
Right to Speedy Trial ( counts 6-8) 
The sixth cause of action alleges violation the California Constitution's right 
to a speedy trial, and the seventh and eighth allege violation of two related 
statues, Penal Code sections 1382 [sets forth statutory right to a speedy trial] and 
859b [codifies the time for a preliminary hearing]. 
Plaintiffs allege that in Fresno, structural deficiencies in the indigent 
defense system routinely force criminal defendants to face unreasonable delays 
in their cases, in violation of their constitutional and statutory speedy-trial rights. 
(Complaint ,i~ 6, 17, 98, 110, 112.) 
Speedy trial rights can be infringed by deficiencies in the indigent defense 
system. (See People v. Johnson ( 1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 571-72 [defendant's right 
to a speedy trial may "be denied by failure to provide enough public defenders 
or appointed counsel, so that an indigent must choose between the right to a 
speedy trial and the right to representation by competent counsel"].) 
The State points out that the right is a "personal" one, and "is waived if not 
properly asserted by a defendant." (Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 
239, 251.) The State contends that for the same reasons set forth above, plaintiffs 
cannot collaterally attack the pleas or sentences of the individuals identified in 
the complaint. Citing to Heck, the State contends that a judicial declaration in 
this case that any plaintiff was deprived the right to a speedy trial "would 
necessarily imply the invalidity" of the proceedings against them, and thus is 
barred. (Heck, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 486.) · 
The cases cited the State sought retrospective relief that would overturn or 
otherwise impugn the validity of convictions previously imposed. (See Heck v. 
Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 [suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983]; 
People v. Villaneuva 196 Cal. App. 4th 411 (2011) [direct appeal of conviction]; 
Gibbs v. Contra Costa County, No. C 11-00403 MEL 2011 WL 1899406 (ND. Cal. 
May 19, 2011) [suit for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983} .) But here, plaintiffs 
seek prospective relief based on the systemic violation of Fresno indigent 
defendants' rights to a speedy trial and hearing. That relief would not overturn 
the result in any individual criminal case. In Wilkinson v. Dotson (2005) 544 U.S. 74, 
7 6, 82, the Supreme Court held that Heck did not bar state prisoners from 
bringing a section 1983 claim challenging the constitutionality of state parole 
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procedures where the prisoners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Accordingly, as with the right to counsel issue, Heck does not bar the speedy trial 
claims since only prospective relief is sought, and plaintiffs are not seeking any 
adjudications that would imply the invalidity of proceedings against any 
individual defendant. 
· Writ of Mandate 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, subdivision (a), provides: "A 
writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, 
corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an 
act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an 
office, trust, or station .... " A writ of mandate "will issue against a 
county, city, or other public body .... [Citations.]" (Venice Town 
Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 
1558, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465.) 
To obtain writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the 
petitioner must show there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate 
remedy; the respondent has a clear, present, and ministerial duty 
to act in a particular way; and the petitioner has a clear, present 
and beneficial right to performance of that duty. (Morgan v. City of 
Los Angeles Bd. of Pension Comrs. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 836, 842, 
102 Cal.Rptr.2d 468.) A ministerial duty is one that is required to be 
performed in a prescribed manner under the mandate of legal 
authority without the exercise of discretion or judgment. (/d. at p. 
843, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 468; Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees 
(2001 J 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 618, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 309.) 
(County of San Diego v. State (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 593 [fn omitted] .J 
"A writ of mandate will lie to compel the performance of an act which 
the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station 
(citation) upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested, in cases 
where there is not a plain, speedy, and. adequate remedy, in the ordinary 
course of law." (Ca/. Corr. Supervisors Org., Inc. v. Dep't of Corr. (2002) 96 
Cal.App.4th 824, 827 [citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085-1086, quotations omitted].) 
"Two basic requirements are essential to the issuance of the writ: (1) A clear, 
present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of.the respondent [citations]; 
and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance 
of that duty[.]" (/bid.; see also Cal. Assn. of Prof Scientists v. Dept. of Finance 
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236 [writ of mandate is to compel "the 
performance of a clear, present, and ministerial duty where the petitioner has a 
beneficial right to performance of that duty"].) 
"A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform in a 
prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and without 
regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act's propriety or 
impropriety, when a given state of facts exists." (Ca/. Assn. of Professional 
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Scientists v. Dept. of Finance (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236.) Mandamus "will 
not lie to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise 
discretion in a particular manner." {Mooney v. Garcia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 
229, 232-233.J 
Plaintiffs identify no ministerial duty owed by the State or Governor. 
While plaintiffs cite Jenkins v. Knight ( 1956) 46 Cal.2d 220, for the 
proposition that "[t]he provisions of our Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory" (id. at p. 224), Jenkins did not rule that all constitutional provisions set 
forth ministerial duties for purposes of mandamus. It addressed former article IV, 
section 12, of the State Constitution, which provided that when vacancies arise 
in the Legislature, the Governor "shall issue writs of election to fill such 
vacancies." (Id. at p. 222.) This imposed a ministerial duty, because the Governor 
was "commanded by the Constitution to issue a proclamation" and had l'no 
discretion" in the matter. (Id. at p. 224.) Plaintiffs identify no ministerial duty 
comparable to this one. Plaintiffs also cite Harn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 
Cal.3d 605, but Horn did not address what constitutes a "ministerial" duty for 
purposes of mandamus. Finally, Molar v. Gates (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d l, involved 
a challenge to specific practices of county officials, and the writ simply ordered 
· them to end the practices. (/d. at p. 6.) Plaintiffs challenge no specific State acts 
and instead allege only a general duty to comply the Constitution. 
Additionally, mandamus cannot issue against the State. "The state acts 
only through its officers or agents," and mandamus thus should be directed "to 
compel an officer or agent of the state to perform an act that 'the law 
specifically enjoins."' (County of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 
Cal .App.4th 580, 593 n. 12.) 
For these two reasons, the demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate 
should be sustained. However, plaintiffs' tactic of commingling the petition for 
writ of mandate with complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief makes it 
somewhat difficult to fashion an order, as it is unclear whether plaintiffs intended 
the various counts to be part of the petition or complaint. There is no distinction 
in the pleading between petition and complaint. In the amended pleading, the 
· two should be pied separately even if bound together in one document. . 
The State also contends that the writ petition is not properly verified. A 
petition for writ of mandate must be verified based on personal knowledge. (Civ. 
Proc.§§ 1069, 1086, 1103(a}; Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 
Cal .App.3d 201, 204.) The petition is verified only by Petitioner Phillips, not by 
Petitioners Yepez or Estrada. Phillips verified only paragraphs 14-16 [describing 
her residence and employment in background] of the Complaint based on 
personal knowledge. The rest she verifies on information and belief. 
However, Code of Civil Procedure section 446 (applicable to petitions for 
mandamus by section 1109) provides that "[a] person verifying a pleading need 
not swear to the truth or his or her belief in the truth of the matters stated therein 
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but may, instead, assert the truth or his or her belief in the truth of those matters 
'under penalty of perjury."' The verification is sufficient at the pleading stage. 
Taxpayer Claim 
The State next contends that the complaint fails to state a claim under the 
taxpayer action statute. Two of the three plaintiffs, Phillips and Estrada, assert 
claims as taxpayers under California's taxpayer-action statute, Code of Civil 
Procedure section 526a (Claim 9). (See Complaint ,i,i 16, 20 [alleging taxpayer 
standing].) 
Section 526a provides that a taxpayer may bring "[a]n action to obtain a 
judgment, restraining and preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or 
injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of" a public entity. The "essence" of 
the action, though, is "an illegal or wasteful expenditure of public funds or 
damage to public property." (Humane Society of the US. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 349,355, citation omitted.) Therefore, to 
survive demurrer, "the plaintiff must cite specific facts and reasons for a belief 
that some illegal expenditure or injury to the public fisc is occurring or will occur." 
(Ibid.) 
However, "[i]t is immaterial that the amount of the illegal expenditures is 
small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving of tax funds." (Wirin 
v. Parker (1957) 48 Cal.2d 890,894 [taxpayer suit proper in constitutional 
challenge to practice of police conducting surveillance using concealed 
microphones]; Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258,269 ["county officials may be 
enjoined from spending their time carrying out" an unconstitutional statute, even 
though that conduct "actually effect[s] a saving of tax funds"].} 
The demurrer to count 9 should be overruled. 
Governor Brown 
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Governor Brown. The Complaint 
alleges that Governor Brown has a duty to "see that the law is faithfully 
executed" (Cal. Const. Art. I,§ l ), which includes a duty to ensure the State 
respects the Constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing the right to 
counsel. 
No California or federal !aw does prescribes any role for the Governor in 
ensuring the legal representation of indigent criminal defendants. The proper 
defendant in a challenge to a state law or policy is the officer charged with 
implementing the challenged measure. (Wolfe v. City of Fremont (2006) 144 
Cal.App.4th 533, 551.) The State points out that courts have issued writs to 
compel action by the governor only when tied to a specific statutory or 
constitutional duty directed to that office that leaves him no discretion, citing 
Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 46 Cal. 2d 220, 224; Harpending v. Haight (1870) 39 Cal. 
189, 209-10.) 
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Plaintiffs cite four decisions for the proposition that the Governor is 
routinely named in constitutional challenges, but those cases all involved specific 
acts by the Governor or legal duties placed upon the Governor. (Hotel 
Employees & Rest. Emp. lnt'I Union v. Davis (1999) 21 Cal.4th 585,590 [Governor 
was obligated to execute a gaming compact}; Cal. Correctional Peace Officers 
Assn. v. Schwarzenegger (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 802, 808 [Governor's acts 
pursuant to declared state of emergency]; Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 
Cal .3d 386; 340 [Governor charged with implementing challenged law]; Bd. of 
Adm. v. Wilson {l 997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1119 [Governor's duties concerning 
the budget process].) 
This case presents no analogous circumstances. The demurrer to the 
petition and complaint should be sustained as to Governor Brown. 
State of California and Governor Edmund Brown, Jr.'s Motion to Strike 
The State separately moves to strike paragraphs 11, 16, 18, 20, 114 and 
115, each count of the Complaint, and each paragraph of the prayer for relief. 
The State then offers no argument in its memorandum in support of moving to 
strike any of these portions of the Complaint. It merely references the demurrer, 
and asserts that each count is legally unsupportable. In other words, the motion 
to strike basically says, "We move to strike everything. See demurrer." The State 
points out that a motion to strike may be appropriate where a portion of a cause 
of action is defective (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court ( 1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 
1682-83), but the motion to strike identifies no portion of the complaint to be 
stricken. 
A motion must be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities. 
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3. l l l 3(a).) The memorandum "must contain a 
statement of facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments 
relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases and textbooks cited in support 
of the position advanced." (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1 l l 3(b); see Quantum 
Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Assocs., Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, 934 [trial 
court not required to "comb the record and the law for factual and legal 
support that a party has failed to identify or provide"].) The memorandum in 
support of the motion to strike fails in this regard. Neither the court nor plaintiffs 
should be required to comb through the memorandum in support of the 
demurrer for arguments supporting the motion to strike. 
Moreover, the motion to strike is entirely duplicative of the demurrer, 
which is being sustained as to any count that fails to state a cause of action. 
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County of Fresno's Demurrer 
Judicial Notice 
For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the 
demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded (i.e., all ultimate 
facts alleged, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law]. 
(Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 
Cal.3d 584, 591 .) The sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts 
pleaded state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. Thus, no 
matter how unlikely or improbable, plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as 
true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. (Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural 
Materials Co. ( 1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) However, the allegations of the 
complaint are not accepted as true if they contradict or are inconsistent with 
facts judicially noticed by the court. The court may consider matters outside the 
complaint if they are judicially noticeable under Educ. Code§§ 452 or 453. (See 
Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal .App.4th 1462, 147 4.) 
In support of its demurrer the County of Fresno presents the most 
expansive and excessive request for judicial notice ever seen by this court. The 
County treats its demurrer as a plaintiff's opposition to a defendant's summary 
judgment motion, but in this case expecting to have the case dismissed by 
raising triable issues of fact. 
The County's requests for judicial notice goes so far beyond the proper 
reasonable use of procedure, that they are denied in their entirety pursuant to 
Evidence Code section 352: 
It is well recognized that the purpose of judicial notice is to 
expedite the production and introduction of otherwise admissible 
evidence .... the matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant . 
. . . judicial notice [is] likewise qualified by Evidence Code, section 
352, which permits the exclusion of any otherwise relevant 
evidence in the discretion of the trial court 'if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading 
the jury." 
(Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 565, 578.) 
Writ of Mandate 
The County contends that the writ petition is demurrable because the 
County Board has no ministerial duty to ensure that Public Defenders' caseloads 
do not exceed any particular caseload cap number. 
Traditional mandate will issue to compel action by a governmental body 
or official when the action is a ministerial duty- one which a public agency is 
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required to perform. (Women Organized for Employment v. Stein (1980) 114 
Cal.App.3d 133, 139 .) 
"A 'ministerial duty' is one generally imposed upon a person in public 
office who, by virtue of that position, is obligated 'to perform in a prescribed 
manner required by law when a given state of facts exists. [Citation.]' 
[Citations.]" (City of King City v. Community Bank of Central California (2005) 131 
Cal.App.4th 913, 926.J It is a duty that a governmental or private body, by or 
through a public or private board, agency, official, or employee, is required to 
perform without the exercise of independent judgment or opinion. (Ellena v. 
Department of Ins. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 198, 205.) Ministerial actions "'are 
essentially automatic based on whether certain fixed standards and objective 
measurements have been met."' (Sustainability of Parks, Recycling & Wildlife 
Legal Defense Fund v. County of Solano Dep't of Resource Mgmt. (2008) 167 
Cal.App.4th 1350, quoting Calvert v. County of Yuba (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 613, 
623.J In general, a ministerial act does not entail the exercise of judgment or 
discretion. "A ministerial act is an act that a public officer is required to perform 
in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority and 
without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning such act's propriety or 
impropriety, when a given set of facts exists." (California Ass'n of Prof. Scientists v. 
Department of Fin. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236, quoting Kavanaugh v 
West Sonoma County Union High Sch. Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916.) 
Plaintiffs cite to case law in which a writ of mandate issued to compel the 
performance of a constitutional duty, and argue that the cases stand for the 
proposition that manda.te will issue notwithstanding a governmental actor's 
discretion. 
In Molar v. Gates ( 1979) 98 Cal.App.3d l, the county permitted male 
prisoners to access minimum security jail facilities with their attendant privileges, 
while denying such facilities and privileges to female inmates. (/d. at p. 6.) The 
petitioners sought a writ of mandate challenging this practice. Though the court 
acknowledged that county officials have discretion in this area, it held that this 
discretion did not preclude mandamus relief to remedy a violation of 
constitutional equal protection rights. (Id. at pp. 19, 20, 23, 25.) 
However, this case does not aid plaintiffs. While the county had discretion 
whether "to provide minimum security facilities or outdoor work opportunities at 
all" (id. at 25), once a facility or privilege was offered to the male inmates, the 
county was mandated, under equal protection principles, to offer it to female 
inmates as well. That was reflected in the language of the writ "to refrain from 
providing facilities and programs to one sex which are not provided to the other 
and to provide like criteria in offering branch jail privileges to the two sexes ... " 
(/d.) Hence, in Molar, once the county made any discretionary decision to 
provide facilities or privileges to one gender of inmates, the county had 
absolutely no discretion to refuse to provide facilities or privileges to the other. 
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Plaintiffs rely on Horn v. County of Ventura (1979) 24 Cal.3d 605, where the 
plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the constitutionality of the 
county's procedures for notifying landowners of governmental conduct 
affecting their property interest. The issue before the court was whether the 
board's action in approving the subdivision map was legislative {requiring no 
notice to landowners) or adjudicatory (requiring notice to landowners) in nature. 
The Subdivision Map Act mandates rejection of a subdivision plan "if it is deemed 
unsuitable in t'?rms of topography, density, public health and access rights, or 
community land use plans." (Id. at pp. 614-615.) The court noted that resolution 
of these issues involve exercise of judgment and balancing of conflicting 
interests, hallmarks of the adjudicative process. The court rejected the concept 
that subdivision approvals are purely ministerial acts requiring no precedent 
notice or opportunity for hearing. {/d. at p. 615.) Therefore, the petitioner was 
entitled to notice. {/d.] 
Plaintiffs rely on Horn because the California Supreme Court granted the 
plaintiffs' writ, despite finding that the challenged conduct involved the exercise 
of judgment and was not a purely ministerial act. But the discussion of 
discretionary versus ministerial acts did not involve the mandate to provide 
notice, but whether notice was required in the first place (i.e., whether it was an 
adjudicatory decision). Horn is not supportive of plaintiffs' position here. Clearly 
there is a constitutional duty, but it does not appear to be a ministerial duty. For 
that reason the demurrer to the petition for writ of mandate should be sustained. 
The County also argues that Penal Code section 987.2(a) provides for a 
Sixth Amendment backstop, because it permits the public defender to decline 
cases for "any ... ", which could include workload. 
When a public defender reels under a staggering workload ... [t]he 
public defender should proceed to place the situation before the 
judge, who upon a satisfactory showing can relieve him, and order 
the employment of private counsel (Pen.Code, s 987a) at public 
expense. 
{Ligda v. Superior Court ( 1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 811, 827-28.) 
It is possible that Penal Code§ 987.2(a) (3) ensures protection of the right 
to counsel, and renders plaintiffs' claims of systemic deficiencies in the indigent 
criminal defense system meritless. But such a determination would require a 
much more detailed record and level of review than can be afforded at this 
stage. 
The County also contends that the petition is speculative because 
plaintiffs rely upon isolated acts to assert the existence of a systemic problem. 
While plaintiffs do give examples, they are not the only allegations 
supporting the ultimate allegations of denial of right to counsel. The County 
complains that while 42,000 criminal cases are initiated in this court every year (Complaint ,i 40), plaintiffs give a mere six examples of alleged Sixth Amendment 
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violations (Complaint ,i,i 98-112). Plaintiffs do not need to allege more than that 
in the Complaint. "[T] he complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a 
cause of action; each evidentiary.fact that might eventually form part of the 
plaintiff's proof need not be alleged." (C.A v. William S. Hart Union High School 
Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) If anything, the Complaint alleges too many 
facts and statistics. The demurrer will not be sustained on the ground that the 
examples pied are insufficient to establish systemic deficiencies. The County 
relies on Rizzo v. Goode (1976} 423 U.S. 362, for the proposition that plaintiffs' 
showing of a relatively few instances of violations by individual peace officers, 
without any showing of a deliberate policy, did not provide a basis for injunctive 
relief. But Rizzo did not involve an attack on the complaint. It was an appeal of 
orders entered after parallel trials of separate actions. It does not address what is 
required at the pleading stage. 
The County continues to attack the existence of systemic deficiencies by 
contending that the writ petition is speculative because per-attorney caseloads 
cannot be reliably predicted, and because the Office's increasing capacities to 
handle work should be the result of recently-expanded PD training budgets. The 
County points to Proposition 47 (requiring misdemeanor sentence instead of 
felony sentence for certain offenses, the full impacts of which are not yet 
known), new positions added since the low point of the Great Recession, 
increase in the training budget. Basically, the County contends that the 
Complaint is speculative because there have been some changes, and 
caseloads could change in the future. The Complaint alleges many structural 
deficiencies in the indigent defense system: excessive caseloads (Complaint ,i,i 
4, 50-52); Case management practices that create conflicts of interest for 
attorneys (Complaint ,i,i 54, 58-59, 80); inadequate resources (Complaint ,i,i 69, 
75, 78-79, 82); inadequate supervision (Complaint 1195). Plaintiffs allege that 
these deficiencies cause the indigent defense system to provide for 
representation that falls below minimum Constitutional and statutory standards 
through inadequate preparation (Complaint 111154, 63, 80, 87-88): lack of 
conflict-free legal representation (Complaint ,i,i 36, 48, 54, 64, 66-71, 79, 80, 95, 
112); lack of continuous representation (Complaint ,i 63); inadequate 
opportunity for consultation (Complaint 1111 64, 66, 68, 69-71 ); interference with 
competent representation due to inadequate training and support from 
supervisors (Complaint ,i,i 53, 60, 74, 75, 95, 97); inadequate factual investigation 
(Complaint ,i,i 78-80); lack of meaningful adversarial testing (Complaint ,i,i 85, 
87). These allegations are sufficient to state a claim against Fresno County under 
counts one through five and nine for systemically depriving Fresno County 
indigent defendants of assistance of counsel, despite the factual disputes raised 
by the County. 
Separation of Powers 
The County then argues that the writ petition is demurrable because it 
requires the court to violate the separation of powers doctrine. 
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"Managing a county government's financial affairs has been entrusted to 
... [the] county board of supervisors, and is an essential function of the board." 
(Citizens for Jobs ahd the Economy v. County of Orange (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 
1311, 1332-1333.} The County contends that the Board had to balance the 
budget during the Great Recession, and in doing so had to limit the number of 
employees. That power was vested in the board of supervisors. (See Hicks v. 
Board of Supervisors ( 1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 228, 234.) 
However, authorities cited by the County indicate that the separation of 
powers issue is not a hard-and-fast bar to the relief sought here. The County cites 
to Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority (1953) 40 Cal.2d. 317,330: 
[T)o state a cause of action warranting judicial interference with 
the official acts of defendants, [the plaintiffs] must allege much 
more than mere conclusions of law; they must aver the specHic 
facts from which the conclusions entitling them to relief would 
follow. 
This citation indicates it becomes more of a sufficiency-of-the-pleading 
issue. Moreover, the County's reply shifts the separation of powers argument 
somewhat. Instead of arguing simply that the cannot issue the orders requested 
because it would violate the separation of powers doctrine, it argues in the reply 
that even if the Strickland test for violation of the right to counsel does not 
apply1, and plaintiffs are not required to plead and prove prejudice, plaintiffs are 
still required to allege actual injury. 
In the reply, the County argues that two cases apply the Strickland test in 
the context of Sixth Amendment systemic deficiency claims: Platt v. State (1996} 
664 N.E.2d 357 and Kennedy v. Carlson ( 1996) 544 N. W .2d 1, 7. 
In Platt, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the Marion County public defender 
system on the ground that it effectively denies indigents the effective assistance 
of counsel. The court found the claim for equitable relief inappropriate because 
a violation of a ·Sixth Amendment right will arise only after a defendant has 
shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial, relying on Strickland. "This prejudice is 
essential to a viable Sixth Amendment claim and will exhibit itself only upon a 
showing that the outcome of the proceeding was unreliable. Accordingly, the 
claims presented here are not reviewable under the Sixth Amendment as we 
have no proceeding and outcome from which to base our analysis." However, 
1 This was discussed above in the State's demurrer. Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 
668, 691-94 held that in order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a 
defendant must show (1) that an error by counsel was professionally unreasonable and (2) that 
there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different (Le., prejudice). I agreed with plaintiffs that, pursuant to 
Luckey v. Harris {11th Cir. 1988) 860 F.2d 1012, the Strickland standard does not apply since 
plaintiffs are seeking prospective relief. 
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I'm not clear on the procedural posture of the case. And there is no mention of 
Luckey. 
Kennedy was a suit by a chief public defender, contending that the 
public defender funding system violates the constitutional rights of indigent 
criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel by not providing 
sufficient funds for the operation of the Fourth Judicial District Public Defender's 
Office. "[C]onstrained by Minnesota's caselaw and the facts before us in this 
case," and because the plaintiff failed to show "injury in fact" to support his 
claim "as required under Minnesota law," the court rejected his request for 
judicial intervention. 
The appeal was of the district court's order granting the plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment. "The court acknowledged that it could not determine 
whether Kennedy's attorneys had provided ineffective assistance of counsel in 
any particular cases, but nevertheless found that judicial relief was necessary to 
prevent this from occurring in the future." 
This decision was reversed on appeal. The appellate court did not apply 
Strickland, but the state's law regarding the requir13ment of a justiciable 
controversy in order to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the 
constitutionality of a statute. The court held that there was no justiciable 
controversy. Moreover, the appeal was of a decision fully evaluating the 
evidence in support of the claims being raised, not an attack on the pleadings. 
Furthermore, the court stated: 
In those cases where courts have found a constitutional violation 
due to systemic underfunding, the plaintiffs showed substantial 
evidence of serious problems throughout the indigent defense 
system. By comparison, Kennedy has shown no evidence that his 
clients actually have been prejudiced due to ineffective assistance 
of counsel. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that · 
Kennedy's office is well-respected by trial judges, it is well-funded 
when compared to other public defender offices, and its attorneys 
have faced no claims of professional misconduct or malpractice. 
Here, there are plenty of allegations of negative consequences of the 
systemic deficiencies alleged. As the County points out in its reply, in Luckey v. 
Harris (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "[i] n a suit 
for prospective relief the plaintiff's burden is to show 'the likelihood of substantial 
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law."' It 
did not say that irreparable injury must be shown to have already occurred, 
which is what the County is arguing. 
In the reply the County also relies on Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 in 
support of the contention that plaintiffs seeking systemic relief must plead and 
prove actual injury. The United States Supreme Court has "consistently required 
States to shoulder affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners meaningful 
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access to the courts." (Bounds v. Smith (1977) 430 U.S. 817, 824.J In Lewis, the 
Supreme Court concluded, however, that actual injury is required to state a 
claim for denial of access to the courts. (518 U.S. at pp. 351-352.J Such injury will 
be shown when an inmate can "demonstrate that a non-frivolous legal claim 
has been frustrated or was being impeded." (/d. at p. 353.) The Court likewise 
rejected the argument that the mere claim of a systemic defect, without a 
showing of actual injury, presented a claim sufficient to confer standing. (/d. at 
p. 349.J 
While this is a compelling argument, the demurrer will not be sustained on 
this ground for the multiple reasons. First, the County's moving papers never 
argue this pleading injury requirement in the context of separation of powers. 
The court may refuse to consider new evidence or arguments first raised in reply 
papers, or it may grant the other side time for further briefing. (See Jay v. 
Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537-1538 ["The general rule of motion 
practice ... is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers"].) Making 
the argument for the first time in the reply deprived plaintiffs of the opportunity to 
address it in their opposition. Second, Lewis arose from a different body of law 
{access to the courts) than is applicable here. Luckey, which arises in the 
context alleged deficiencies in provision of indigent defense services, does not 
require plaintiffs seeking prospective relief to show injury. Third, the appeal was 
of an injunction issued after a three-month bench trial. It was not an attack on 
the pleadings. The Court in Lewis found that the plaintiffs in that case had not 
set forth sufficient evidence to support a conclusion of systemwide violation and 
imposition of systemwide relief. (Lewis, supra, 518 U.S. at pp. 359-60.) Here, such 
a determination is premature. Fourth, plaintiffs allege that indigent defendants 
regularly experience wrongful conviction of crimes, guilty pleas to inappropriate 
charges, waiver of meritorious defenses, compelled waiver of right to speedy 
trial, harsher sentences than the facts of the case warrant, and waiver of appeal 
and post-conviction rights. (Complaint ,i 98.) Plaintiffs allege that Yepez suffered 
harm as a result of deficiencies in the County's public defense system. 
(Complaint ,i,i 99-106.J This and other examples (Complaint ,i,i 107-112) allege 
injury. 
Unclean hands 
The County contends that the writ petition is demurrable as to Petitioner 
Yepez, relying on the doctrine of unclean hands and judicial notice of records 
related to plaintiff Yepez's criminal case. However, as noted above, the request 
for judicial notice of these records is denied. Even if the request were granted, 
the court could not conclusively say on such a scant record that allegations as 
to Yepez are false. 
Other Available Remedies 
The County contends that the writ petition is demurrable because 
plaintiffs have other remedies. 
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Where the primary right of a plaintiff is of a legal and not an equitable 
nature, and where a remedy for the invasion of that right is provided by law, 
equitable relief will not be granted if the legal remedy is adequate and capable 
of affording the plaintiff a complete measure of justice. (Philpott v. Superior 
Court (1934) 1 Cal.2d 512.) To be entitled to equitable relief in such 
circumstances, the plaintiff must show that he or she cannot obtain adequate or 
complete relief qt law. (Id.) Equity will refuse to come to a plaintiff's assistance 
when he or she has lost his or her legal remedy by failing to take advantage of it 
where possible. (Hogan v. Horsfall (1928) 91 Cal.App.37.J 
The County primarily focuses its unclean hands arguments on Yepez. For 
the reasons discussed above, the court will not sustain any demurrers based on 
the requests for judicial notice. 
Moreover, an alternative remedy is only adequate if "it is capable of 
directly affording and enforcing the relief sought" in the writ. (Dutton v. Daniels 
(1923) 190 Cal. 577, 582.) Avenues for individual recourse are not an adequate 
alternative in suits seeking systemic relief for "wholesale deficiencies." (See Knoff 
v. City and County of San Francisco (1969) [rejecting argument that taxpayers 
should have pursued individual challenges to assessments of their own properties 
in writ action challenging misconduct in tax assessor's office].) As in Knoff, 
plaintiffs have pied individual examples "as symptomatic of the much broader 
problem the action is designed to relieve." Plaintiffs in this action do not seek to 
relieve the Public Defender as counsel in any particular case, but to correct 
wholesale deficiencies in the indigent defense system. Since a Marsden motion 
would provide relief only to the individual who filed it, that alternative is not 
capable of directly affording a systemic remedy. Accordingly, any failure by 
Yepez failure to file a Marsden motion does not render the writ petition 
demurrable. 
The County argues that the writ petition is demurrable because injunctive 
relief. also sought in the Complaint, is an adequate remedy. The fact, however. 
"that an action in declaratory relief lies ... does not prevent the use of mandate." 
(Brock v. Superior Court ( 1952) l 09 Cal. App. 2d 594, 603; accord Glendale city 
Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale ( 197 5) 15 Cal.3d 328, 343 n.20 [ citing 
Brock].) "Where relief is sought against a public body, however, the availability 
of injunctive relief is not a bar to mandate. (Ca/. Teachers Assn. v. Nielsen (1978) 
Cal.App.3d 25, 28-29, citing County of L.A. v. State Dept. Pub. Health (1958} 158 
Cal.App.2d 425,446, and Brock, supra.) For the first time in its reply, the County 
cites to authority addressing this point. However, none of the authority cited 
indicates that dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate is warranted for the 
simple reason that injunctive relief is also sought. 
Taxpayer Standing 
The County argues that plaintiffs Phillips and Estrada lack taxpayer 
standing. 
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The County argues, like the State, that plaintiffs are not alleging wasteful 
or illegal expenditure of public funds; rather, they allege that not enough money 
is devoted to public defense. However, "[i]t is immateiial that the amount of the 
illegal expenditures is small or that the illegal procedures actually permit a saving 
of tax funds." (Wirin v. Parker (1957} 48 Cal.2d 890, 894 [taxpayer suit proper in 
constitutional challenge to practice of police conducting surveillance using 
concealed microphones]; Blair v. Pitchess (1971} 5 Cal.3d 258,269 ["county. 
officials may be enjoined from spending their time carrying out" an 
unconstitutional statute, even though that conduct "actually effect[s] a saving 
of tax funds."]) Thus, I would reject this particular attack on plaintiffs' taxpayer 
standing. 
The County argues that plaintiffs lack taxpayer standing because the 
relief sought would violate the separation of powers doctrine. It argues that it 
would violate the separation of powers doctrine because plaintiffs attack the 
Board's discretionary budgetary decisions. The County contends that Thompson 
v. Petaluma Police Department (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 101, 106, introduced 
separation of powers into the taxpayer standing issue by stating, "Courts should 
not interfere with a local government's legislative judgment on the ground that 
its funds could be spent more efficiently." However, the court never explicitly 
addressed or applied the separation of powers doctrine. For application of this 
concept, the County relies on San Bernardino County v. Superior Court (2015) 
239 Cal.App.4th 679. However, San Bernardino County does not discuss 
separation of powers doctrine either. 
In San Bernardino County, taxpayer organizations brought suit challenging 
a settlement agreement between the County and a private entity after a former 
county supervisor pied guilty to receiving bribes from the private entity in 
exchange for his vote approving the 2006 settlement agreement. The taxpayer 
organizations sought to have the settlement agreement declared void under the 
state law governing conflicts of interest of government officials. The County 
demurred on the grounds that the taxpayers lacked standing to bring the suit. 
The taxpayer organizations argued that they had standing under section 526(a). 
The trial court overruled the County's demurrer and the County filed a writ 
petition regarding the denial of its demurrer. The court of appeal for the Fourth 
Appellate District disagreed with the trial court, rejecting the taxpayer 
organizations' standing theories. (Id. at pp. 684-688.) The court held that 
"[t]axpayersuits are authorized only if the government body has a duty to act 
and has refused to do so. if it has discretion and chooses not to act, the courts 
may not interfere with that decision." (/d. at p. 686, internal citations omitted.) 
Here, the County clearly has Constitutional duties to provide effective 
counsel for indigent criminal defendants. It has acted, but allegedly not in a 
manner that satisfies the Constitutional command. San Bernardino County 
addresses situations where the governmental body has the discretion whether or 
not to pursue legal action. The court found that there was no provision of law 
requiring it to pursue any claim. (/d. at p. 687.) For that reason the plaintiffs did 
not have taxpayer standing. (Id. at p. 688.) The case is not instructive on the 
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issue of whether plaintiffs in this case have standing to sue as taxpayers in this 
case. The demurrer on this ground will be overruled. 
Pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3. l 312(a) and Code Civ. Proc.§ 
l 019 .5{a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this 
tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will 
constitute notice of the order. 
Tentative Ruling J1 ,, fi f\ / _., f j / // 
Issued By: __ __,._.IUI __ /V?L____.......__--'o:;..:.:n __ ,..,,/_ ii,...-/..,_,/ '-44 ...... VJ::......,.. 7 (Judge's initials) I (D6te) 
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On Date: 04/13/2016 Clerk, bY---------"--=----1,1,,&.....,, .... (d...,.... ___ , Deputy 
Place of mailing: Fresno, California 93724-0002 ~ , j: 
L. Whiwle '// 
Daniel C. Cederborg 
Fresno County Counsel 
2220 Tulare STreet, 5th Floor 
Fresno, CA 93721 
Novella Y. Coleman 
ACLU of Northern California 
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
Aaron Jones 
455 Golden Gate AVE 
STE 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
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